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Supreme Court Jurisprudence of Tax Fairness
Richard J. Wood ∗
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1
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INTRODUCTION

In Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith offered his views on tax fairness. “The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the
support of the government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to
their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue which
2
they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state.” This view
∗

Professor of Law, Capital University Law School.
LAURENCE J. PETER, PETER’S QUOTATIONS: IDEAS FOR OUR TIME 464 (William
Morrow & Co. 1977).
2
ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 498 (Prometheus Books 1991) (1776). Smith
also offered three other observations about fair tax systems:
II. The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain, and not arbitrary. The time of payment, the manner of payment,
1
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that fairness requires a proportional link between tax and taxpayer
3
income is known as the benefit principle. It and other views of tax
equity, including the equal sacrifice principle, the standard of living
principle, and the ability to pay principle, can be seen as subordinate
to a superior tax fairness structure that is comprised of two fairness
norms. That structure is known collectively as vertical and horizontal
4
equity. These two tax fairness principles are corollaries of each
5
other:
First, we can postulate a kind of bedrock notion of tax fairness,
called horizontal equity, which yields the following maxim: likesituated taxpayers should be taxed the same. It’s hard to disagree with
that.
Now, if some people are like-situated, the rest must be differently situated, and it cannot be correct to say that people who are
differently situated (relative to me) should be taxed the same as

the quantity to be paid, ought all to be clear and plain to the contributor, and to every other person. . . .
III. Every tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the manner, in
which it is most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay it. . . .
IV. Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and to
keep out of the pockets of the people as little as possible, over and
above what it brings into the public treasury of the state.
Id. at 499.
3
See LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND
JUSTICE 16 (Oxford Univ. Press 2002). The benefit principle reflects the view “[t]hat
fairness in taxation requires that taxpayers contribute in proportion to the benefit
they derive from government.” Id. Murphy and Nagel think that this view should be
rejected along with other pre-distributive concepts of fairness including horizontal
and vertical justice. “The benefit principle, however, cannot be saved from incoherence . . . . It is inconsistent with every significant theory of social and economic
justice.” Id. at 19. See also Leo P. Martinez, “To Lay and Collect Taxes”: The Constitutional Case For Progressive Taxation, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 111, 123 (1999) (“Benefit
theory is divided into two arguments, ‘property benefits’ and ‘income-equalsbenefit.’”). Although he predates Murphy and Nagel, Professor Martinez’s discussion of these two ways of looking at benefit theory help explain the distributive
justice concerns raised by Murphy and Nagel. According to Professor Martinez,
“[t]he ‘property benefits’ argument suggests that, although personal benefits are
roughly uniform, the amount of property benefits rises with the amount of property
owned. . . . The ‘income-equals-benefit’ argument suggests that personal income is
the measure of the ‘personal well-being’ that the government protects.” Id.
4
See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 3, at 13 (“Everyone agrees that taxation should
treat taxpayers equitably, but they don’t agree on what counts as equitable treatment.
It is standard practice in addressing the question to distinguish between vertical and
horizontal equity. According to this conception, vertical equity is what fairness demands in the tax treatment of people at different levels of income . . . ,and
horizontal equity is what fairness demands in the treatment of people at the same
levels.”).
5
See JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE, AND
POLICY 120–27 (3d ed. 2004).
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me. Rather, differently situated people should be taxed differently. This
6
maxim is known as vertical equity.

These two norms, horizontal and vertical equity, stated as one
principle with two important divisions, have long been used to evalu7
ate the fairness of tax legislation. Most published work on tax
fairness has focused on these two norms and the four views of tax jus8
tice in the political (legislative) context rather than the judicial. My
concern is that the tax structure of horizontal and vertical equity,
within which the principles mentioned above and others may compete for acceptance, ought to be reflected in the United States
Supreme Court’s tax decisions.
My thesis is that the Court uses systemic, but not substantive, tax
fairness norms to classify taxpayers as similarly situated to each other
and the government. Further, a trend is developing in the Court’s
Commerce Clause and tax fairness jurisprudence: the Court has become more willing to consider distributive justice principles in the
context of vertical tax equity. My research shows that the Court has
refined horizontal equity into what I call systemic and substantive
branches. Furthermore, the Court’s use of vertical equity suggests a
starting point for future application of distributive justice principles
in Supreme Court tax fairness jurisprudence.
I have organized this Article by focusing on three areas in which
the Court has used tax fairness norms in resolving tax disputes: tax
administration, statutory construction, and state taxation tested
against the Equal Protection and Commerce Clauses of the United
9
States Constitution. In reviewing the materials, I found that the
6

Id. at 122.
Martinez, supra note 3, at 116 (“[C]rafting a system of taxation that results in a
fair distribution has proven to be a daunting task. In their attempt to achieve a fair
distribution of the tax burden, tax policy-makers rely on two crude principles: horizontal equity and vertical equity.”).
8
See Kenseth v. Comm’r, 259 F.3d 881, 885 (7th Cir. 2001) (characterizing “equity in taxation [as] being a political rather than a jural concept”).
9
To determine the scope, extent, and manner of use of tax fairness norms, I
searched for decisions of the United States Supreme Court in which the Court employed fairness principles in resolving tax controversies. The process I used was a
simple word search in a commercial Supreme Court database. I looked for cases in
which the term “tax” was linked to terms such as “fairness” or “equity.” I then selected those cases that I thought best represented the Court’s jurisprudence in
applying tax fairness norms. Finally, I compared the Court’s use of tax fairness
norms to generally accepted legislative tax fairness analysis. In this way I hoped to
determine whether the principles used to guide legislation can be seen reflected in
the final outcomes of tax controversies at the Supreme Court level.
Some decisions in which the Court used the word “fairness” in connection with a
tax dispute were rejected and not included in my analysis. This exclusion of cases
7

WOOD 1-9-06 FINAL.DOC

424

1/9/2006 10:04:26 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:421

Court employs both vertical and horizontal equity norms as well as
subordinate equity principles such as the benefit principle and the
ability to pay principle in resolving tax disputes. I start by explaining
the tax fairness norms observed in the cases reviewed. I then show
how the least controversial norm, horizontal equity, was developed
early by the Court and expanded over time. I next show that the
Court divided horizontal equity into two branches. One branch, systemic horizontal equity, evaluates similarity without resort to content.
In other words, the Court does not consider ability to pay measured
by income, wealth, or consumption when using this branch of horizontal equity. Instead, analysis under systemic horizontal equity is
concerned primarily with consistency and, to a lesser degree, regularity and certainty of application. The second branch of horizontal
equity, substantive horizontal equity, uses ability to pay as the primary
criterion for grouping similarly situated taxpayers. The evolution of
vertical tax equity and the related points of the benefit principle and
the ability to pay principle are also addressed in this Article.
II. TAX FAIRNESS NORMS
The literature on tax fairness discusses two structural methods
for analyzing the fairness of federal income tax questions: equity
measured along vertical and horizontal axes. Equity measured horizontally and vertically can be succinctly stated as requiring that
similarly situated taxpayers must be treated alike and that differently
situated taxpayers must be treated in ways that reflect their differences.
There is very little debate about whether horizontal equity
10
should be considered a tax policy norm. The principle that similarly situated taxpayers should be treated similarly is neither new nor
controversial. As is so often true in matters of tax, however, the diffioccurred primarily because the Court did not explain what it meant by the fairness
terms it used or because the explanation, or implicit but unstated fairness claim, was
better or more completely developed in other decisions. From the group of cases
that remained I uncovered other cases in which the Court did not use the term “fairness,” but did use equity norms in resolving the tax issues presented in the case.
Pursuant to this approach I was left with a group of cases that addressed tax fairness
issues in three contexts: tax administration, statutory construction, and state taxation
tested against the Equal Protection and Commerce Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.
These three subgroups are linked by the Court’s application of tax fairness principles.
10
Richard A. Musgrave, Equity and the Case for Progressive Taxation, in TAX JUSTICE:
THE ONGOING DEBATE 9, 9 (Joseph J. Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry Jr. eds., 2002)
(“The principle of horizontal equity—that people in equal positions should be
treated equally—is hardly debatable.”).
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culty arises in the application of the norm rather than in its definition. The primary concern centers on the criteria that should be
used to determine whether taxpayers are similarly situated. No two
taxpayers are exactly alike. Consider for example two wage-earners
working side-by-side for exactly the same compensation. Leaving
aside personal issues such as marital status or number of dependants
and focusing exclusively on work-related issues, the taxpayers may still
have significant differences that prevent them from being treated exactly alike.
One might incur deductible employment-related
expenses such as uniform laundering fees or continuing professional
11
education that the other does not. The question may then become
12
In other words, are the similarities strong
one of materiality.
enough in some relevant way to overcome any differences that exist
between the taxpayers?
One of the components of horizontal equity is an analysis of the
commonalities between taxpayers. This analysis leads to identifying
whether these commonalities are material and sufficiently similar to
warrant similar treatment. Material and sufficient similarity would
both be required. Taxpayers who are alike in material ways may
nonetheless have differences in scale that overpower the initial finding of similarity. The taxpayers in the above illustration may be alike
in that they both incur employment-related business expenses associated with continued professional education for their identical
professional positions. If Taxpayer A elects to take her professional
classes from a school that charges her $1,000, while Taxpayer B takes
the same classes from a school that charges $10,000, we may need to
refine our criteria for similarly situated taxpayers. We may find, for
example, that the difference in price reflects an education-related
item such as class size, a tangentially related item such as computer
study aids, or additional unrelated expenses such as the provision of
meals. Presented with these possibilities, we would have to decide
whether Taxpayers A and B should be treated similarly. In other
words, we would have to determine whether both would be able to
deduct the full cost of their tuition. This, in turn, might depend on
whether the differences in cost were due to material factors, such as
11

Employment-related expenses of this type are known as employee business expenses and are deductible under I.R.C. § 162 (2000) subject to the limitations of
I.R.C. § 67 (2000). See also I.R.C. § 62(a)(2) (2000) (reimbursed employee business
expenses).
12
See DODGE ET AL., supra note 5, at 122 (“Once it is acknowledged that not every
person is like-situated, it is necessary to come up with a ‘difference principle,’ a way
of telling whether people are alike or different, and, if different, by what degree different . . . .”).
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class size or information technology, or immaterial factors such as lavishly catered meals.
It may be that there is only one axis for horizontal equity and the
distinctions I raise are merely slicing the materiality component into
increasingly slimmer sections. It may be, however, that materiality is
the first cut and further refinements are on a different axis. Materiality may refer to whether the taxpayer is in a class of taxpayers entitled
to a particular treatment, such as those who incur employee business
expenses. The magnitude of the benefit or burden imposed on that
class, however, may be a separate question that no longer requires
consideration of whether the taxpayer is entitled to be treated similarly to other taxpayers, but rather the extent to which the taxpayer
benefits or pays within the class of similarly identified taxpayers.
My reading of the cases is that the Court adopts the former view
expressed above. I believe that the Court would see the first two distinctions (class size or computer study aids) raised in the employee
business expense illustration as further refinements of material differences rather than separate questions measured along another axis.
The difference in education expense due to educational costs is likely
to be seen as immaterial whereas the difference in expense due to
costs unrelated to education is likely to be seen as material. These
material differences distinguish taxpayers who are entitled to deduct
amounts paid for education and those who are prohibited from deducting amounts paid that are not for education. Accordingly,
expenses for meals that were folded into distinctions based upon
educational costs would not be permitted under horizontal equity
analysis.
The foregoing paints the standard picture of horizontal equity. I
would like to further refine the concept by dividing this standard approach into what I will call substantive horizontal equity and systemic
horizontal equity. The Court views these two components as distinct
and often applies one while declining to apply the other. In the
above described illustration, I believe that the Court would not use
ability to pay in determining which taxpayers are similarly situated.
Rather, the Court would analyze the tax fairness of allowing one taxpayer a deduction for education expenses while denying the same
deduction to another by examining consistency, regularity, or certainty of application, and not by examining the taxpayers’ ability to
pay, consumption, or wealth. In other words, the Court would ask
whether any of the taxpayers incurred expenses within a consistently
defined boundary called educational expenses. So long as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue was consistent in applying a
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reasonable definition of educational expenses, the Court would uphold the Commissioner’s definition even if taxpayers with identical
income, wealth, or consumption were treated differently. This, in my
view, is an application of systemic horizontal equity.
Historically, commentators have studied the fairness of any tax
burden in any tax system (income, estate, sales) by first determining
whether it falls equally on taxpayers of similar income, wealth, or
13
consumption. If, for example, one wanted to know whether a ten
percent tax on the sale of alcohol would be fair, one would want to
know whether taxpayers who consume equal amounts of alcohol were
taxed equally. Fairness requires equally situated taxpayers to be
taxed equally. The main issue is identifying what should be considered in determining which taxpayers are equally situated. If
consumption of alcohol is the measure of equality, then the tax
would be fair because every taxpayer would pay a ten percent tax on
every dollar used to purchase alcohol. If, however, the measuring
tool is income, then the tax burden will be born more heavily by
those who use a high percentage of their income to purchase alcohol,
14
even if the actual amounts of alcohol consumed are identical. This
form of tax equity analysis, termed substantive horizontal equity,
evaluates the substantive economic status of taxpayers as measured by
consumption, income, or wealth, and is different from another form
of horizontal equity analysis that does not evaluate the economic
status of taxpayers. This second form of horizontal equity analysis,
termed systemic horizontal equity, does not evaluate the economic
status of taxpayers, but instead evaluates the consistency, certainty,
and regularity of application of the law.
Substantive horizontal equity asks about all of the above described issues in the context of comparing various taxpayers’ ability to

13

See John A. Miller, Rationalizing Injustice: The Supreme Court and the Property Tax,
22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 79, 126 (1993) (“Depending on the form of tax in question, the
possible indices of equality may be income, consumption or wealth.”).
14
If the tax on alcohol is five percent, and Taxpayer A with $60,000 of annual
income consumes $600 worth of alcohol in one year, she will pay $30 in tax—0.05%
of her income. If Taxpayer B with $120,000 of annual income also consumes $600 of
alcohol, she will pay the same $30 in tax, but it will be a smaller burden when compared to her annual income—only 0.025%. Accordingly, if the two are compared on
the basis of consumption, they are similarly situated and similarly treated, and thus,
the tax would be viewed as fair. If percent of income is the measure of fairness, then
the tax can be criticized as unfair since Taxpayer A carries twice the burden of Taxpayer B, despite the fact that they both consumed $600 worth of alcohol. Thus,
similarly situated taxpayers are being taxed differently as to the percent of their income. See ALAN GUNN & LARRY WARD, CASES, TEXT AND PROBLEMS ON FEDERAL
TAXATION 10 (West 5th ed. 2002).
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pay in the forms of income, wealth, and consumption.
Systemic
horizontal equity is related to substantive horizontal equity in that
both look for similarly situated parties, but systemic horizontal equity
does not ask any questions about economic status as measured by
consumption, wealth, or ability to pay. Instead, systemic horizontal
equity is more concerned with whether taxpayers, and the government, receive consistent, regular, and certain treatment under the
16
law. Through a series of decisions, the Court has come to endorse
systemic horizontal equity as a tool for interpreting tax laws. In two
related cases concerning state property tax, the Court declined the
opportunity to employ substantive horizontal equity in interpreting
17
state tax laws.
A great deal of the energy of modern tax fairness thinking has
been directed at analyzing whether vertical equity is a valid component of tax fairness. Vertical equity is essentially identified with the
taxation of incomes at different rates with the higher rates reserved
18
for higher incomes. The leading treatise on this point is The Uneasy
19
Case for Progressive Taxation by Walter J. Blum and Harry Kalven, Jr.
The central question addressed is: “On what grounds is a progressive
20
tax on income to be preferred to a proportionate tax on income?”
Blum and Kalven defend progressive taxation based upon the principle of equality of sacrifice of taxpayers as measured by a theory of the
21
marginal utility of money. In the authors’ words, “Assuming a dollar is worth less to the man with the larger income than to the man
with the smaller income, a dollar taken from the former will involve
15

See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
See Ivan Allen Co. v. United States, 422 U.S. 617, 641 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting). This case concerned a corporate taxpayer who was assessed accumulated
earnings taxes under I.R.C. § 531. Id. at 620–21 (majority opinion). The Court
found that the taxpayer must value readily marketable securities at their market value
rather than cost basis in determining whether the taxpayer is liable for accumulated
earnings tax. Id. at 629. Justice Powell in dissent characterized the holding as follows: “In short, the Court construes the statute to mean that although unrealized
appreciation is not included in computing earnings and profits, it is includable in
determining whether earnings and profits have been accumulated unreasonably.”
Id. at 639 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell goes on to recommend that the
Court adopt principles of sound accounting practice that “have the virtues of consistency, regularity and certainty—virtues that also assure fairness and reasonable
predictability in the Commissioner’s administration of this penalty tax.” Id. at 641.
17
Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm’n 488 U.S. 336 (1989); Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992).
18
Donna M. Byrne, Progressive Taxation Revisited, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 739, 759 (1995).
19
WALTER J. BLUM & HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE
TAXATION (4th impression, Univ. of Chicago Press 1963).
20
Id. at 3.
21
Id. at 49–51.
16
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22

less sacrifice than one taken from the latter.” But some, including
Blum and Kalven, question whether the marginal utility of income
falls with rising income and whether different individuals will derive
23
equal utility from similar incomes.
This criticism can be illustrated by considering two groups of individuals. One group might be comprised of a set of entrepreneurs
who greatly value every dollar they earn as a sort of tally in a game
played with other similarly inclined entrepreneurs; perhaps Donald
Trump might be emblematic of this group. Consider next a group of
spiritually fulfilled individuals with no interest in earthly units of
money; perhaps the late Mother Theresa might represent this group.
To the entrepreneurs, the utility of money might rise with rising incomes as they overtake other players in their pursuit of recognition
for their economic prowess. Similarly, the utility of money for the
spiritual person might remain constant, above subsistence levels, and
therefore also not be supportive of a model of declining utility of
money.
From these two groups we might infer that marginal utility of
money may not decline with increasing income and that there is no
agreement on equality of utility of money between the groups and
thus between individuals. Blum and Kalven concede that there is uncertainty in the calculus of utility, but they claim:
However uncertain other aspects of progression may be, there is
one thing about it that is certain. A progressive tax on income
necessarily operates to lessen the inequalities in the distribution
of that income. In fact, as we noted at the outset, progression
cannot be defined meaningfully without reference to its redistributive effect on wealth or income. It would seem therefore that
any consideration of progression must at some time confront the
24
issue of equality.

Current scholarship infused the debate about vertical equity with
25
theories of distributive justice. While the cases I reviewed do not
explicitly address distributive justice claims, they do lay the ground22

Id. at 51.
Id. at 53 (“The assumption is that the utility of the last dollar taken in taxes is
independent of the total dollars the taxpayer had before taxes. It may be true that to
take $2 from a man with $5,002 and to take none from a man with $5,000 entails less
total sacrifice than taking $1 from each; but surely it is highly debatable that this is
true if in the example the richer man had an income of $10,000, had grown accustomed to this standard of living, and for the first time $4,998 in taxes had just been
taken from him.”).
24
Id. at 70.
25
See Linda Sugin, Theories of Distributive Justice and Limitations on Taxation: What
Rawls Demands From Tax Systems, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1991 (2004).
23
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work for beginning the discussion. The Court has developed a body
of work that describes governmental benefits that may be considered
in evaluating whether a taxpayer is paying his or her fair share of the
costs of those benefits. That is a starting point for evaluating whether
there has been a distribution of wealth through benefits and taxation.
Blum and Kalven might have predicted that the Supreme Court
would need to address notions of connectivity between benefits and
taxes because they understood taxes not to be “one-sided trans26
fer[s].” No one disagrees that to some extent taxpayers can be seen
27
to purchase benefits with the taxes they pay. The question becomes
the degree of congruity between taxes paid and value received. This
is another way of asking what counts as a benefit. One method for
evaluating benefits and their relationship to taxes is to attempt to
quantify the value of government services received by taxpayers. Another method would be to use income or wealth as a proxy for that
28
value. The Supreme Court, in several cases addressing state taxation of out-of-state taxpayers, began the difficult task of connecting
governmental services to taxes paid by those who benefit from the
29
services.
III. SYSTEMIC OR ADMINISTRATIVE FAIRNESS
One of the first applications of fairness principles to tax questions arose in procedural due process claims, brought by taxpayers,
that focused on tax statutes of limitations. One case concerned the
retroactivity of tax legislation in which the Court raised fairness con30
cerns sua sponte. In the other case, the Court let stand lower court
decisions concerning the fairness of unequal treatment of a taxpayer,
who filed a fraudulent return followed by a non-fraudulent return,
and claimed to be similarly situated with taxpayers who file non31
fraudulently without previously filing fraudulently. In each case, the
Court takes up fairness questions in the context of statutes of limitations and provides illustrations and applications of discrete principles
of fairness.

26

BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 19, at 35.
Id.
28
Id. at 35–39; see also Martinez, supra note 3, at 123 (“The ‘income-equalsbenefit’ argument suggests that personal income is the measure of the ‘personal wellbeing’ that the government protects.”).
29
See infra Section VI.
30
Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co. (Electric Storage Battery IV), 329 U.S.
296 (1946).
31
Badaracco v. Comm’r, 464 U.S. 386 (1984).
27
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A. Statute of Limitations and Horizontal Equity
Tax statutes of limitations were at issue in both Rothensies v. Elec32
33
tric Storage Battery Co. and Badaracco v. Commissioner.
In Electric
Storage Battery, the taxpayer paid federal excise taxes on the sale of
electric storage batteries from 1919 to 1926 and properly deducted
the amount paid in excise taxes from its income in determining its
34
income tax liability. The taxpayer brought suit for refund of the ex35
cise taxes. In 1935, the government repaid the taxpayer over one
million dollars in settlement of a judgment of the United States Dis36
trict Court with respect to the excise taxes. The period from 1919
to 1922 was not part of the judgment or the settlement because it was
barred by the statute of limitations from the action in the district
court. The Collector of Internal Revenue, Mr. Rothensies, treated
the settlement received by the taxpayer in 1935 as income for that
37
year. The taxpayer claimed that based upon a theory of recoupment the taxpayer should be allowed to reduce the amount of
income tax owed by the amount of excise tax it overpaid for the years
38
1919 to 1922. In other words, the taxpayer wanted credit for taxes
incorrectly paid but which were non-refundable due to the passage of
time and the application of the statute of limitations.

32

329 U.S. 296 (1946).
464 U.S. 386 (1984).
34
In the first of a series of cases, Electric Storage Battery Co. v. McCaughn (Electric
Storage Battery I), 52 F.2d 205, 210 (E.D. Pa. 1931), the taxpayer successfully sued for
the recovery of excise taxes paid on batteries manufactured by the taxpayer. The district court awarded the taxpayer $973,532.57 plus interest, totaling $1,362,861.27. Id.
The taxpayer then settled his claim with the IRS for $825,151.52 plus interest, for a
total of $1,395,515.35. Electric Storage Battery Co. v. Rothensies (Electric Storage Battery II), 57 F. Supp. 731, 732 (E.D. Pa. 1944); see also, Electric Storage Battery, 329 U.S. at
298. The taxpayer then sued to recover income taxes paid in 1935 based upon a
claim for recoupment of excise taxes paid from 1919 to 1922, which the district court
granted. Electric Storage Battery II, 57 F. Supp. at 732. The Third Circuit agreed, Electric Storage Battery Co. v. Rothensies (Electric Storage Battery III), 152 F.2d 521, 526
(3d Cir. 1945), but the Supreme Court reversed. Electric Storage Battery IV, 329 U.S. at
303.
35
Electric Storage Battery II, 57 F. Supp. at 731.
36
Electric Storage Battery III, 152 F.2d at 522. The taxpayer was awarded a refund
of $973,532.57 in excise tax overpayment, plus interest. In Electric Storage Battery I, the
taxpayer settled the claim for a refund of $825,151.52 in excise tax, plus interest. 52
F.2d at 210.
37
Electric Storage Battery IV, 329 U.S. at 298. The District Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court agreed that the amount was income in the year
received by the taxpayer. Id.
38
Id.
33
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The taxpayer’s claim was based upon the Supreme Court’s deci39
sion in Bull v. United States, which held that taxpayers may assert a
claim for recoupment against a government claim for unpaid taxes
when the taxpayer’s claim “aris[es] out of some feature of the trans40
action upon which the [government’s] action is grounded.”
Contrary to the government’s view, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit applied the doctrine by defining “transactions” to include those arising out of a single line of business that extended over
different tax years. The court held:
The doctrine of recoupment is based on concepts of fairness. We
see no reason, therefore, for hedging the “transaction” part of the
requirement within close quarters, especially where, as here, there
is a logical connection between main claim and recoupment
claim. As to the fairness of the matter, we agree with the District
Court where his opinion stated: “Every consideration of fair dealing demands that the taxpayer be credited as against its present
liability with the taxes which it has been illegally compelled to pay,
and I think that the decisions of the courts fully justify such a so41
lution.”

The Supreme Court agreed that the taxpayer’s position was
grounded on valid fairness principles, but nevertheless, ruled against
the taxpayer:
It probably would be all but intolerable, at least Congress has
regarded it as ill-advised, to have an income tax system under
which there never would come a day of final settlement and which
required both the taxpayer and the Government to stand ready
forever and a day to produce vouchers, prove events, establish
values and recall details of all that goes into an income tax contest. Hence a statute of limitation is an almost indispensable
element of fairness as well as of practical administration of an income tax policy.
....
As statutes of limitation are applied in the field of taxation, the
taxpayer sometimes gets advantages and at other times the Government gets them. Both hardships to the taxpayers and losses to
the revenues may be pointed out. They tempt the equity-minded
42
judge to seek for ways of relief in individual cases.

39

295 U.S. 247 (1935).
Id. at 262.
41
Electric Storage Battery III, 152 F.2d at 524 (quoting Electric Storage Battery II, 57 F.
Supp. at 735).
42
Electric Storage Battery IV, 329 U.S. at 301–02.
40
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The Court of Appeals characterized the taxpayer’s recoupment claim
43
as required by “consideration[s] of fair dealing.” The government
claimed, and the Supreme Court ultimately agreed, that a statute of
repose is an “almost indispensable element of fairness” in the admini44
stration of income tax. The Court did not specifically say why the
government’s fairness claim was found to be superior to the taxpayer’s fairness claim, but the Court’s analysis suggests some
possibilities.
First, the Court articulated a fairness principle unique to statutes
of limitations. The Court explained the nature of statutes of repose
as being grounded in fairness:
Statutes of limitation, like the equitable doctrine of laches, in
their conclusive effects are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been
allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have
faded, and witnesses have disappeared. The theory is that even if
one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice
to defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be
free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to
45
prosecute them.

Then, the Court elevated the fairness attributes of the statute of limitations over those of the taxpayer’s recoupment claim based on the
system-wide increase in fairness achieved by the statute compared to
the individual fairness that might have been achieved by recoup46
ment. The Court indicated that the recoupment claim would have
required an examination of the taxpayer’s books and records for
47
many years before the claim was brought. This was so, the Court
explained, because while the one issue of overpaid excise taxes cut in
favor of the taxpayer, there may have been other unexamined issues
48
in the earlier years that might cut in the government’s favor. Although both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found that
the taxpayer’s claim should, in the interest of fairness, be allowed to
offset the current tax liability because taxes were mistakenly paid in

43

Electric Storage Battery III, 152 F.2d at 524 (quoting Electric Storage Battery II, 57 F.
Supp. at 735).
44
Electric Storage Battery IV, 329 U.S. at 301.
45
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Order of R.R. Telegraphers v.
Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348–49 (1944)).
46
See id. at 302 n.3. The Court’s decision might also be explained by appeals to
efficiency or caseload management. However, the Court employs fairness language
in its analysis and I will take it at its word. Id.
47
See id. at 302.
48
See id. at 302 n.3.
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49

prior years, the Supreme Court declined to create a rule that would
allow recoupment claims of undetermined certainty to prevail over
50
the fairness claims certain to effect the entire tax system. Accordingly, the individual fairness claim was subordinated to a systemic
fairness claim of the statute of limitations.
This analysis suggests that while the Court was sympathetic to the
taxpayer’s fairness claim, it viewed the claim as incomplete because it
did not take into account the scope of inquiry into past years’ transac51
tions that would be necessary to judge the claim’s fairness.
Additionally, the Court indicated, the claim failed to take into account a larger systemic fairness that is inherent in all statute of
limitations problems; namely, that administration of claims without
52
finality would be unworkable. As a result, the Court decided to analyze the taxpayer’s claim on the basis of fairness principles including
horizontal equity.
Applying horizontal equity, the Court observed that the tax53
payer’s recoupment claim could work in both directions. It would
be possible for both taxpayers and the tax collector to circumvent the
54
statute of limitations and make valid claims for a refund. However,
55
in McEachern v. Rose, the Court ruled against allowing the tax collector to make a claim for reduction of a taxpayer’s overpayment refund
56
after the statute of limitations on an earlier unpaid tax had run. In
that case, the Court found that the government could not reduce the
taxpayer’s otherwise valid refund based on claims for taxes that the
government failed to assess years earlier and that were now barred
57
from collection by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, in order
to allow the taxpayer’s claim in Electric Storage Battery, the Court would

49
50
51

Electric Storage Battery IV, 329 U.S. at 299.
See id. at 302.
The Court stated:
Every assessment of deficiency and each claim for refund would invite a
search of the taxpayer’s entire tax history for items to recoup. This
case provides evidence of the extent to which this would go. When this
suit was brought in 1943, the claim pleaded as a recoupment was for
taxes collected over twenty years before and for over sixteen years
barred by the statute.

Id.
52
53
54
55
56
57

See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
Electric Storage Battery IV, 329 U.S. at 302 n.3.
See id.
302 U.S. 56 (1937).
Id. at 62.
Id. at 60.
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have had to reverse McEachern or face another serious fairness issue in
allowing recoupment by taxpayers, but not by the government.
Horizontal equity is usually stated as a requirement that similarly
situated taxpayers should receive similar, if not identical, treatment
on issues that are materially indistinguishable. Electric Storage Battery
varied the traditional understanding of this principal in two ways.
First, the government, rather than the taxpayer, raised the claim and,
second, the similarly situated parties were the government and the
taxpayer rather than the taxpayer and another taxpayer. However,
neither the fact that the government raises the claim, nor the substitution of the government for another taxpayer, diminishes or
otherwise alters the force of the claim or changes the basic principles
on which horizontal equity claims are based.
The commonality between the taxpayer and the government in
Electric Storage Battery is the application of the statute of limitations.
58
For good and sufficient reasons the Court, in McEachern, found that
the government could not employ recoupment to resurrect timebarred claims to offset timely claims for refund made by the tax59
payer. It reasoned that to allow the taxpayer to employ recoupment
and to prohibit its use by the government would implicitly violate
60
horizontal equity.
Similarly, the taxpayer in Electric Storage Battery
failed because the principles of horizontal equity, consistency, regularity, and certainty prevented the taxpayer’s use of recoupment
61
where the government was also constrained in that way. Horizontal
equity is based upon the application of the law in ways that promote
uniformity of treatment among parties. Therefore, reasons for treating one party in a particular way should be just as valid when applied
to another party if the facts that are material to such treatment are
the same.
58

Although the decision in McEachern was primarily an exercise in statutory
construction, the Court applied a systemic horizontal equity analysis, noting “[t]he
similar treatment accorded by the statutes to credit against an overdue tax, and to
payment of it; the prohibition of credit of an overpayment of one year against
a barred deficiency for another; and the requirement that payment of a barred
deficiency shall be refunded, are controlling evidences of the congressional
purpose . . . .” McEachern, 302 U.S. at 62.
59
Id.
60
The Court characterized its holdings in Stone v. White, 301 U.S. 532 (1937), and
McEachern as “[e]quitable considerations not within the reach of the statutes . . . .”
McEachern, 302 U.S. at 62. In my view, the equitable consideration referred to by the
Court, though not explicitly explained, is systemic horizontal equity.
61
“As statutes of limitations are applied in the field of taxation, the taxpayer
sometimes gets advantages and at other times the Government gets them.” Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery (Electric Storage Battery IV), 329 U.S. 296, 302 (1946).
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These cases add to our understanding of the application of horizontal equity in two ways. First, the basic tax policy of horizontal
equity can now be seen as acting more broadly, encompassing not
only similarly situated taxpayers, but also the government and tax62
payers if they are similarly situated.
Second, when applying
horizontal equity principles the Court finds systemic horizontal
claims to be more persuasive than individual fairness claims, which, if
63
upheld would violate horizontal equity principals.
Application of horizontal equity requires courts to determine
which parties are similarly situated and the degree of their similarity.
In Electric Storage Battery, the Court held that the government, as well
as another taxpayer, could be considered a party for the purpose of
64
horizontal equity analysis. With respect to degree of similarity, in
65
Badaracco v. Commissioner, discussed below, the Court held that a
taxpayer who files a fraudulent return and one who fraudulently
failed to file a return in the first place are distinct for the purpose of
horizontal equity analysis and, thus, may be subject to disparate
66
treatment.
In Badaracco, the taxpayers complained of disparate treatment
they received when compared to other taxpayers that they identified
67
as similarly situated. Here, the taxpayers, Ernest Badaracco, Sr. and
Ernest Badaracco, Jr., conceded that they filed fraudulent partnership and individual tax returns for calendar years 1965 through
68
On August 17, 1971, the taxpayers filed non-fraudulent
1969.
amended returns for those years and paid additional tax as required
69
by the amended returns. The amended returns were filed after federal grand juries in New Jersey subpoenaed books and records of the
partnership, but before the taxpayers were indicted for filing false
70
and fraudulent returns. The taxpayers pleaded guilty to the charge
with respect to tax year 1967’s returns and the remaining counts were

62

“Whether or not the statute, §§ 608 and 609 of the Revenue Act of 1928, be
taken to compel the conclusion we reach in this case, the court’s recognition that
both parties to taxation are affected impartially, though perhaps harshly, by policy of
repose has application here.” Id. at 302 n.3.
63
Id. at 301.
64
See id. at 302 n.3.
65
464 U.S. 386 (1984).
66
Id. at 401.
67
Id. at 400.
68
Id. at 389.
69
Id.
70
Id.
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71

dismissed. On November 21, 1977, six years and three months after
the filing of non-fraudulent amended returns, the Commissioner
mailed notices of deficiency to the taxpayers for each of the tax years
72
1965 through 1969.
The Commissioner in Badaracco argued that § 6501(c)(1) of the
Internal Revenue Code (hereinafter “Code”) denied any period of
limitations in the case of “a false or fraudulent return with the intent
73
to evade tax.” Among other arguments, the taxpayers asserted that
it would be “unfair ‘to forever suspend a Sword of Damocles over a
taxpayer who at one time may have filed a fraudulent return, but who
has subsequently recanted and filed an amended return providing
the Government with all the information necessary to properly assess
74
the tax.’” The taxpayers claimed that reading § 6501(c) literally, as
the Commissioner and the courts below had read it, “produces a disparity in treatment between a taxpayer who in the first instance files a
fraudulent return and one who fraudulently fails to file any return at
75
all.” If a taxpayer who has fradulently failed to file a return for a
particular year later files a non-fraudulent return for that tax year,
under I.R.C. § 6501(c)(3) that filing will trigger the running of the
normal three-year statute of limitations. The Badaraccos claimed that
they were similar to such a taxpayer and should therefore get similar
76
treatment even though they had filed an earlier fraudulent return.
In practice, this would have meant that the filing of the nonfraudulent second return would have triggered the running of the
statute of limitations and the government would have been timebarred from assessing any additional deficiencies against the taxpayers. Under § 6501(c)(1), however, the Court denied that result to
77
the Badaraccos. Despite recognizing that the Badaraccos had filed
non-fraudulent second returns, the Court declined to treat them as it
would treat fradulent non-filers.
The Court found, however, that Congress intended different
limitation results in the two circumstances described by the taxpay78
ers.
It arrived at this conclusion using standard statutory
construction techniques and added that if its interpretation were
71

Badaracco, 464 U.S. at 389.
Id.
73
Id. at 392 (quoting I.R.C. § 6501(c)(1) (2000)).
74
Id. at 400 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 26, Deleet Merch. Corp. v. United
States, 464 U.S. 386 (1984) (No. 82-1509)).
75
Id. at 400.
76
Id.
77
Badaracco, 464 U.S. at 395–96.
78
Id. at 401.
72
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wrong then Congress should use clearer language. The Court also
took up the fairness claim itself and examined its merits. The Court
rejected the taxpayers’ fairness claim, stating that “a taxpayer who has
filed a fraudulent return with intent to evade tax hardly is in a position to complain of the fairness of a rule that facilitates the
80
Commissioner’s collection of the tax due.” Its fairness analysis relied upon estoppel and systemic horizontal fairness. The estoppel
notion reflected in the Court’s statement that the taxpayers were not
in a position to complain of fairness is not unique to tax and is not
apposite to this Article. The second fairness analysis, systemic horizontal fairness, is consistent with tax fairness theory and will be
discussed below.
The taxpayers in Badaracco alleged that their second, nonfraudulent, return provided the Commissioner with all of the information that the Commissioner needed to properly assess the
81
taxpayers liability. If true, then the taxpayers’ claim was merely for
equal treatment with other taxpayers who had provided the same
level of information and for treatment different from those who
82
fraudulently file and never recant. The Badaraccos appealed to the
83
second principal of tax fairness that emerged from Electric Storage
Battery, similar treatment for taxpayers who are systemically similarly
situated, and its corollary, different treatment for differently situated
84
taxpayers.
The Court rejected the Badaraccos’ claim by denying that they
were similar to other taxpayers who had not first filed fraudulent re85
turns. The Court articulated significant administrative difficulties
that followed when a taxpayer first filed a fraudulent return and then
86
These difficulties infiled an amended non-fraudulent return.
cluded the untrustworthiness of a second return from a fraudulent
source (since the new return comes after the taxpayer has already
made false statements under penalty of perjury), the likelihood that
underlying books and records may also have been falsified, and the
administrative timing problems of coordinating a criminal fraud case
79

Id.
Id. at 400.
81
Id. at 398.
82
Id. at 400.
83
The first principal being that the government, as well as the taxpayer, could
bring a horizontal equity claim. Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery (Electric Storage
Battery IV), 329 U.S. 296, 302 (1946).
84
See id. at 301–03; see also discussion supra text accompanying notes 32–63.
85
Badaracco, 464 U.S. at 400.
86
Id. at 398.
80
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with a six year statute of limitations and a civil fraud case with any87
thing less than the same period of limitations.
For the same reasons listed above, the Court also rejected the
Badaraccos claim that they were not materially different from taxpayers who fraudulently failed to file any return and later filed a non88
fraudulent return. In such a case, the non-fraudulent return would
start the running of the statute whereas the subsequent filing of a
89
While the
non-fraudulent return by the Badaraccos would not.
Court conceded that from the taxpayers’ point of view the similarities
between a fraudulent filer and a fraudulent non-filer were significant,
the differences, discussed above, when viewed from the Commissioner’s
90
perspective, were greater.
The Court viewed the similarities offered by the Badaraccos as
91
material. However, the Court viewed the differences offered by the
Commissioner as equally material and more persuasive in that they
spoke to a fairer system rather than to fairness in a single applica92
In a way, the Court was reaffirming the first principal of
tion.
horizontal equity, articulated in Electric Storage Battery, that the government was entitled to be viewed as equal to any other party to a tax
93
fairness claim. Here, the government successfully argued that taxpayers who file fraudulent returns present very different
87
88
89

Id. at 398–99.
Id. at 401.
The Court stated:
The [Badaraccos’] argument centers in § 6501(c)(3), which provides that in a case of failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed ‘at
any time.’ It is settled that this section ceases to apply once a return
has been filed for a particular year, regardless of whether that return is
filed late and even though the failure to file a timely return in the first
instance was due to fraud.

Id.
90

“Thus, although there may be some initial superficial plausibility to this argument on the part of petitioners, we conclude that the argument cannot prevail.” Id.
91
Badaracco, 464 U.S. at 401.
92
The Court implied this when it stated that “it seems to us that a taxpayer who
has filed a fraudulent return with intent to evade tax hardly is in a position to complain of the fairness of a rule that facilitates the Commissioner’s collection of the tax
due.” Id. at 400.
93
In his dissent, Justice Stevens cites Electric Storage Battery for the proposition that
“‘a statute of limitation is an almost indispensable element of fairness as well as of
practical administration of an income tax policy.’” Id. at 405–06 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery (Electric Storage Battery IV), 329
U.S. 296, 301 (1946). As I have argued, the fairness principle of Electric Storage Battery
is that the government and the taxpayer are equally situated in that they both have
an equal stake in the outcome, and that systemic fairness (consistency, regularity,
and certainty) is the standard of practical administration referred to by the Court in
Electric Storage Battery.
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administrative problems from taxpayers who do not file at all, even if
94
the reason for non-filing is fraud. Accordingly, the Badaraccos did
not state a claim for similar treatment because they could not establish that they were sufficiently similar to the taxpayers they referenced
95
to warrant similar treatment.
Although both decisions accept the government as a party to a
96
horizontal equity analysis, Badaracco took Electric Storage Battery to the
next logical step. Badaracco pushed the analysis of horizontal equity
further by examining the nature of claims of similar situation be97
tween parties, and looking for material similarities and differences.
When both are found, the Court weighs the fairness claims. In Badaracco, the Court viewed the Commissioner’s systemic fairness claim to
be more persuasive than the taxpayers’ claim of individual unfair98
The Commissioner’s claim had the virtue of consistency
ness.
(because of the similarities between taxpayers that the Commissioner
treated similarly), regularity (because the Commissioner routinely
applied the same rule to all taxpayers), and certainty (because it was a
99
bright line test from which there was no deviation). Accordingly,
although unrelated to ability to pay, the Court’s analysis was nonetheless horizontal because it looked for material similarities and
differences in grouping taxpayers. The point of similarity was systemic rather than substantive because it was about application within
the system, not about the Code’s content.
In these two cases, the Court adopted horizontal equity principles in applying systemic tax rules, even though it did not articulate
an explicit horizontal equity standard. This is the start of what this
94

Id. at 398–99 (majority opinion).
Id. at 401.
96
In Electric Storage Battery, the Court stated that “[a]s statutes of limitation are
applied in the field of taxation, the taxpayer sometimes gets advantages and at other
times the Government gets them. Both hardships to the taxpayers and losses to the
revenues may be pointed out.” 329 U.S. at 302. In Badaracco, the Court is not so explicit in stating its goal for the equal application of tax fairness to the taxpayer and
government, but the Court’s holding implicitly makes the same point. 464 U.S. at
386.
97
Badaracco, 464 U.S. at 398–401.
98
Trustworthiness and reconciliation of civil and criminal fraud administration
were cited by the Court in favor of the government. Id. at 398–99. Both of those reasons are within what I have called systemic horizontal equity because they concern
tax administration regularity. These reasons concern the efficient process of evaluating the tens of thousands of tax returns that the government must examine. If the
Court agreed with the taxpayers’ claim that their similarity to other taxpayers was a
higher value than the systemic horizontal equity value of regularity, then the efficient
and fair treatment of all taxpayers would have been diminished.
99
See id. at 398–99.
95
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Article calls “systemic horizontal equity.” It is systemic rather than
substantive because it does not employ substantive horizontal equity
concerns such as ability to pay, wealth, or consumption. Instead, the
Court applies systemic horizontal equity principles of consistency,
regularity, and certainty. The distinction is important because systemic horizontal equity is content-neutral whereas substantive
horizontal equity is content-based.
B. Development of Systemic Horizontal Equity Beyond Statute of
Limitations Cases
Although the Supreme Court may not always use the word fairness in addressing tax questions, fundamental fairness principles are
sometimes implicitly used in analyzing the statutes. Moreover, taxpayers in some cases have claimed that the treatment they received
from the Service was unfair. Accordingly, even though the Court
does not explicitly use fairness in its analysis, it may do so by implication in ruling on taxpayers’ claims of unfair treatment.
The Commissioner publishes rulings and takes litigation positions consistent with his or her understanding of the law at the time.
As this understanding evolves, the Commissioner may change positions previously announced. Taxpayers have argued that these
changes in position can be unfair to taxpayers in one of two ways.
First, taxpayers have argued that unfairness might result if a taxpayer
relies in good faith upon a position taken by the Commissioner and
structures a transaction or takes other measures consistent with the
Commissioner’s position only to find a later change in position, without a change in the law. Second, an unfairness claim has been
asserted when one taxpayer received favorable tax treatment under a
ruling of the Commissioner and a second identically situated taxpayer received a different and less favorable treatment by the
Commissioner after a change in position, even when there has been
no change in the law. The Supreme Court recognizes neither of
these circumstances as unfair to the taxpayer.
100
In Dickman v. Commissioner, the taxpayers made substantial in101
terest-free loans to their son.
The issue before the Court was
whether the foregone interest was a gift within the meaning of
§ 2501(a)(1) of the Code, subjecting the taxpayer to gift tax liabil102
After determining that the foregone interest was a gift under
ity.

100
101
102

465 U.S. 330 (1984).
Id. at 331–32.
See id. at 331.
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the Code, the Court turned to the taxpayers’ claim that their reliance
upon previous positions announced by the Commissioner insulated
them against liability under the Commissioner’s new interpretation
103
The Court rejected the claim, specifically noting that
of the Code.
the Commissioner may “change an earlier interpretation of the law,
104
even if such a change is made retroactive in effect.” Moreover, the
Court indicated, “[t]his rule applies even though a taxpayer may have
105
relied to his detriment upon the Commissioner’s prior position.”
Although the taxpayers’ claim of unfairness was expressly based
upon detrimental reliance, it was also implicitly based upon a comparison of their treatment by the Commissioner against that afforded
to taxpayers who reported identically structured transactions prior to
the Commissioner’s change of view as to the correct interpretation of
the law. By denying the taxpayers’ unfairness claim, the Court denied a systemic horizontal equity claim, as well. Thus, the case stands
for the proposition that, while the systemic horizontal equity norms
of consistency, regularity, and certainty may help in resolving tax disputes, they must defer to the superior administrative norm of
continuing statutory interpretation and the necessary disparate
treatment that may ensue.
In Dickman, the Court held that a horizontal tax equity claim
that compares taxpayers in identical circumstances who were afforded disparate treatment due to shifting interpretations of the law
106
will not succeed. If the rule were otherwise, of course, the Commissioner could never change his or her mind and seek enforcement of
a change of opinion about the law. The Court rightly seems to have
viewed the taxpayers’ fairness claim as seeking to elevate horizontal
equity over the Commissioner’s good faith reinterpretations of the
Code, which due to the passage of time, works different results on
similarly situated taxpayers.
Interestingly, this principle works in only one direction. Suppose that the Court had found that the taxpayers’ interpretation of
103

See id. at 342–43 (“Finally, petitioners urge that the Commissioner should not
be allowed to assert the gift taxability of interest-free demand loans because such a
position represents a departure from prior Internal Revenue Service practice. This
contention rests on the fact that, prior to 1966, the Commissioner had not construed
the gift tax statutes and regulations to authorize the levying of a gift tax on the value
of the use of money or property. From this they argue that it is manifestly unfair to
permit the Commissioner to impose the gift tax on the transactions challenged
here.” (citing Crown v. Comm’r, 585 F.2d 234, 241 (7th Cir. 1978); Johnson v.
United States, 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966))).
104
Id. at 343.
105
Id. (citing Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 73 (1965)).
106
See supra notes 103–05 and accompanying text.
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§ 2501(a)(1) correct. Further, suppose that the Commissioner’s earlier interpretation had been the opposite, so that earlier the
Commissioner had thought the foregone interest was a gift but then
reversed his opinion and viewed it as outside the scope of
§ 2501(a)(1). Now taxpayers who were adversely affected by the prior
ruling would be able to seek review of their returns and the Commissioner would accede to his new position. In this way, horizontal
equity would be available when the Commissioner changes his mind
107
In other words, the Commissioner
in ways that favor the taxpayer.
would extend the latter treatment, now viewed to be statutorily correct, to earlier taxpayers, identically situated, who had previously not
received the same treatment as taxpayers who were later in time.
108
In Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, the taxpayer received favorable rulings in 1934 and 1938, which exempted the
109
taxpayer from federal income taxes.
Those rulings were retroactively revoked in 1945 and the Commissioner sought tax liability for
110
The Court found that the “Commistax years 1943 and 1944.
sioner’s earlier rulings were grounded upon an erroneous
interpretation of the term ‘club’ in § 101(9) and thus were based
111
upon a mistake of law.” The Court continued by noting the specific
grant of authority in the Commissioner to apply any “ruling, regula112
tion, or Treasury Decision” retroactively.
Although the taxpayer’s position in Automobile Club was similar to
that advanced by the taxpayer in Dickman, it was somewhat stronger
because, in Automobile Club, the taxpayer who received the favorable
treatment under prior Commissioners’ interpretations of the law was
113
the same taxpayer who was now bringing the claim.
Nevertheless,
the Court rejected the taxpayer’s claim for the same reasons given in
114
Dickman.
From these two cases, it is clear that the Court will not
107

This would not be true, however, for taxpayers who are time-barred by the statute of limitations.
108
353 U.S. 180 (1957).
109
See id. at 181.
110
See id.
111
Id. at 183.
112
Id. at 184 (“‘The Secretary, or the Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary, may prescribe the extent, if any, to which any ruling, regulation, or Treasury
Decision, relating to the internal revenue laws, shall be applied without retroactive
effect.’”) (quoting I.R.C. § 3791(b) (1939)).
113
“The Commissioner had determined in 1934 that the petitioner was a ‘club’
entitled to exemption under provisions of the internal revenue laws . . . . The Commissioner revoked these rulings in 1945 . . . .” Id. at 182.
114
“[I]t is well established that the Commissioner may change an earlier interpretation of the law, even if such a change is made retroactive in effect.” Dickman v.
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consider disparate taxpayer treatment, based upon changed ruling
positions, as a violation of the principles of systemic horizontal equity.
One may instead analogize administrative changes of position to
legislative modification. Taxpayers divided by legislation that affects
their tax liabilities may only be viewed as similar if the events at issue
115
arose prior to or after the relevant legislation.
Similarly, while the
taxpayers in Automobile Club and Dickman drew comparisons with
other taxpayers positioned on the other side of the administrative
change, the Court viewed taxpayers as falling into similar groups only
116
if they fell on the same side of the change. Thus, systemic horizontal equity allows for administrative change in the same way it allows
for legislative change. Taxpayers may make systemic horizontal equity claims, but the group within which they may find similarities
117
must account for the change.

Comm’r, 465 U.S. 330, 343 (1984). “[I]t is clear from the language of the section
and its legislative history that Congress thereby confirmed the authority of the Commissioner to correct any ruling, regulation or treasury decision retroactively, but
empowered him, in his discretion, to limit retroactive application to the extent necessary to avoid inequitable results.” Automobile Club of Mich., 353 U.S. at 184.
115
Most legislation is prospective in that the statute applies to “conduct, events,
and circumstances which occur after its enactment.” 2 NORMAN J. SINGER,
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 41.01 (5th ed. Clark Boardman Callaghan
1993). Tax legislation is more complex in that “[t]ax legislation may be retroactive if
the legislature clearly so intends.” Id. § 41.10.
116
“We thus find no basis for disagreeing with the conclusion, reached by both
the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals, that the Commissioner, having dealt with
petitioner upon the same basis as other automobile clubs, did not abuse his discretion.” Automobile Club of Mich., 353 U.S. at 186.
117
No discussion of horizontal equity in the administration of the Internal Revenue Code would be complete without some mention of IBM v. United States, 343 F.2d
914 (Ct. Cl. 1965). In that case, the Court of Claims allowed the taxpayer to prevail
on a horizontal equity claim in which IBM sought a favorable private letter ruling on
a matter materially identical to one on which its only competitor had obtained a favorable letter ruling. The Claims Court allowed IBM the same treatment afforded its
competitor, even though the Commissioner had changed his mind on the law in the
interim. Courts have subsequently limited the application of IBM to cases in which
the taxpayers are the only two competitors in the field, both have sought guidance
that only one has received, and where that guidance was initially favorable, but subsequently shown to be incorrect. See, e.g., Peerless Corp. v. United States, 185 F.3d
922, 929 (8th Cir. 1999). It is, of course, not clear how the Supreme Court would
have decided IBM, given its view that systemic horizontal equity does not require that
taxpayers receive identical treatment when separated by a change in the Commissioner’s opinion about the law. Therefore, it seems likely the Supreme Court would
not have ruled as the Claims Court did. However, because this Article’s scope is confined to Supreme Court jurisprudence of tax fairness, I will not address the issues
raised in IBM.
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IV. THE ROLE OF FAIRNESS IN STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
When interpreting individual Code provisions, the Supreme
Court has embraced a notion of fairness that reflects horizontal equity. The Court has construed statutory provisions in ways that result
118
in “consistency, regularity, and certainty.”
In other words, the
Court follows the principle of systemic horizontal equity. The Court
employed substantive horizontal equity where the distinctions created
by Congress were meant to further horizontal equity based upon ability to pay, wealth, or consumption.
119
United States v. Correll concerned a taxpayer who, in the pursuit
of his wholesale grocery business, left home early in the morning, ate
breakfast and lunch on the road, and returned home in time for din120
ner.
He sought to deduct the cost of his breakfast and lunch as
business expenses under § 162(a)(2) of the Code. Section 162(a)(2)
provides that traveling expenses, including meals, may be deducted if
they are incurred “while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or
121
business.” The Commissioner interpreted that provision to exclude
122
expenses incurred on travel that required neither sleep nor rest.
The Court analyzed § 162(a)(2) by weighing the fairness of the
Commissioner’s interpretation against that of the taxpayer.
The analysis begins not only with § 162, which authorizes de123
ductibility of business expenses, but also with § 262, which denies
deductibility of personal expenses. It begins here because of an apparent horizontal equity problem posed by the deductibility of meal
expenses to one class of taxpayers as opposed to the non-deductibility
of the same expenses by other classes of taxpayers. In other words,
taxpayers who do not travel for business reasons, and who have no
other business connection to their meals, may not deduct the cost of
their meals, whereas taxpayers who can show a business connection
to their meals may be able to deduct their expenses. This seeming
inconsistency is the result of the intersection of two tax principles.
One principal, expressed in § 262, prohibits the deductibility of personal expenses and the other, expressed in § 162, allows the
deduction of business expenses including those that would otherwise
124
be viewed as personal if imbued with sufficient business content.
118
119
120
121
122
123
124

Ivan Allen Co. v. United States, 422 U.S. 617, 641 (1975).
389 U.S. 299 (1967).
See id. at 303.
I.R.C. § 162(a)(2) (2000).
Correll, 389 U.S. at 302.
I.R.C. § 262 (2000).
Correll, 389 U.S. at 300.
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The Court said that the fact that the Code specifically allows the cost
of meals to be deducted by some taxpayers while denying deductions
to other taxpayers who spend money for meals can be viewed as a
125
“windfall” for business travelers.
Congress artlessly divided meals into deductible and nondeductible based upon whether the meals were incurred while “away
126
from home.”
The Court was left with the job of fashioning a rule
that fairly grouped taxpayers into each category, deductible and
nondeductible, based upon the thin statutory distinction of being incurred away from home in the pursuit of business. This is a
horizontal equity problem because the Court must find a test based
on characteristics that link taxpayers with similarly strong business
reasons for deducting the meal expense and exclude taxpayers with
similarly weak business reasons for incurring the meal expense. This
is a substantive horizontal equity analysis because the distinction concerns questions about differing consumption rather than the systemic
horizontal equity questions of consistency, regularity, and certainty.
The chief reason for deducting meal expenses associated with
business travel is the duplication of expenses incurred by such a traveler. Normally, a person can plan his or her business day around the
personal necessity of meals; breakfast at home, lunch either prepared
at home or eaten at restaurants by choice; and dinner at home. The
businessperson who is traveling away from home generally loses the
option of home-prepared meals. The business traveler is therefore
viewed as incurring the expenses of meal preparation twice, once at
home in the form of food preparation facilities in the taxpayer’s residence and again when the businessperson must pay others to prepare
127
meals he or she could otherwise prepare at home.

125

“[T]he taxpayer who incurs substantial hotel and restaurant expenses because
of the special demands of business travel receives something of a windfall, for at least
part of what he spends on meals represents a personal living expense that other taxpayers must bear without receiving any deduction at all.” Id. at 301–02.
126
“There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses
paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on a trade or business, including
. . . traveling expenses (including amounts expended for meals and lodging other
than amounts which are lavish or extravagant under the circumstances) while away
from home in the pursuit of a trade or business . . . .” I.R.C. § 162(a)(2) (2000).
127
“Because § 262 makes ‘personal, living, or family expenses’ nondeductible . . .
the taxpayer whose business requires no travel cannot ordinarily deduct the cost of
the lunch he eats away from home. But the taxpayer who can bring himself within
the reach of § 162(a)(2) may deduct what he spends on his noontime meal although
it costs him no more, and relates no more closely to his business, than does the lunch
consumed by his less mobile counterpart.” Correll, 389 U.S. at 302 n.7.
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The Court acknowledged that it should defer to the interpretation of the statute given by the Commissioner but also struggled to
find principled methods for grouping business travelers that fairly
treated similarly situated taxpayers alike and which furthered the dis128
tinctions based upon personal consumption and business expense.
In other words, the Court agreed that similarly situated taxpayers
should be treated alike and then sought to identify those groups consistent with the demands of §§ 162 and 262.
The taxpayer in Correll argued in favor of a rule that turned on
either the distance from home or the number of hours spent away
129
from home. The Commissioner rejected both rules and argued for
one that denied deductibility to any taxpayer who was not required to
130
sleep or rest while away from home.
None of these rules was required by the statute, yet one consistent rule was desired.
The Court viewed application of both standards advanced by the
taxpayer as inconsistent with the treatment of other taxpayers who
traveled miles that were greater or fewer than any number that the
131
Understanding that any rule it fashioned
Court might select.
would be subject to the criticism that it was in some measure arbi132
trary, the Court therefore rejected the taxpayer’s claim of similarity
or difference between taxpayers otherwise similarly situated based
upon distance or time. In so doing, it acknowledged that the factors
advanced by the taxpayer were reasonable ways to group similarly
situated taxpayers. Several amicus briefs supported the taxpayer’s
133
The Court considered the distance factor and the time
proposals.
128

Id. at 304–05. The Court stated that “[o]rdinarily, at least, only the taxpayer
who finds it necessary to stop for sleep or rest incurs significantly higher living expenses as a direct result of his business travel, and Congress might well have thought
that only taxpayers in that category should be permitted to deduct their living expenses while on the road.” Id. at 304–05. In other words, only the taxpayer who
incurs extra consumption gets to deduct expenses that would not otherwise be deductible because they are personal (e.g., meals).
129
Id. at 303–04.
130
Id. at 302.
131
The Court stated:
Any rule in this area must make some rather arbitrary distinctions,
but at least the sleep or rest rule avoids the obvious inequity of permitting the New Yorker who makes a quick trip to Washington and back,
missing neither his breakfast nor his dinner at home, to deduct the
cost of his lunch merely because he covers more miles than the salesman who travels locally and must finance all his meals without the help
of the Federal Treasury.
Id. at 303–04.
132
Correll, 389 U.S. at 303.
133
Id. at 304 n.14.
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factor the taxpayer suggested, however, and found that both would
exclude taxpayers from the group entitled to deduct meal expenses
occupied by Mr. Correll without addressing the underlying reason for
134
In support of the “sleep
the distinction—duplication of expenses.
135
or rest” rule the Court stated:
By so interpreting the statutory phrase, the Commissioner has
achieved not only ease and certainty of application but also substantial fairness, for the sleep or rest rule places all one-day
travelers on a similar tax footing, rather than discriminating
against intracity travelers and commuters, who of course cannot
136
deduct the cost of the meals they eat on the road.

The Court viewed distance traveled and time spent traveling as inapposite to the reason for distinguishing between similarly situated
taxpayers in the meal context—closer ties to the business generated
extra expense, and thus extra consumption. The Court explained its
preference for the Commissioner’s view by reasoning that, “only the
taxpayer who finds it necessary to stop for sleep or rest incurs
significantly higher living expenses as a direct result of his business
137
travel . . . .”
This finding fits into one of the principled reasons for distinguishing between taxpayers who are otherwise similarly situated. If
taxpayers incur greater expense than they otherwise would, and they
do so for business reasons, then the statute may be applied to address
the expense incurred for those reasons. Accordingly, the Court in
Correll adopted a more equitable interpretation by grouping taxpayers
according to duplicative meal expenses. The Court’s reasoning incorporated a substantive horizontal equity analysis because it
concerned the taxpayer’s ability to pay tax on income earned from
the taxpayer’s trade or business. If duplicative expenses that, although personal in nature, were incurred for a business purpose were
not deductible, then the taxpayer would be disadvantaged with respect to others with the same income who did not incur the
duplicative expense. The Court’s interpretation recognized that distinction.
In Correll, the Court looked for a way to group taxpayers that furthered the underlying tax theory that supported the benefit that
134

Id. at 305 n.18.
In order to meet the statutory requirement that the taxpayer is away from
home in order to deduct the cost of meals incurred as part of business travel, the
Commissioner’s position is that the taxpayer must “sleep or rest” while on the business trip. Id. at 299.
136
Id. at 303.
137
Id. at 304–05.
135
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138

taxpayers sought.
In that case, the underlying tax theory concerned a redundant expense associated with meals incurred for
139
The distinctions of time and distance offered by
business reasons.
the taxpayer were viewed as being further from those reasons than
140
the distinction offered by the Commissioner.
Regardless of
whether one agrees with the Court’s conclusion, the interesting aspect of the decision is the effort made to identify the criteria that are
most congruent with the underlying reason for the distinction. The
relevance of the offered criteria is measured by the Court against the
141
reason for the statute, hardly a surprising proposition. Yet all of the
criteria offered would advance the goal of distinguishing between
taxpayers who were more likely to have incurred extra expense due to
travel and those who were not. The Commissioner’s criteria had the
virtues of both a bright line test and flexibility.
A person traveling by plane might cover more ground than one
traveling by car in the same time frame. If that time were just a few
hours, it is difficult to see how meal expenses greater than normal
would have been made necessary even though distance traveled
might in other contexts capture the statutory notion of a duplicative
expense. Distance traveled, therefore, seems less relevant than time
traveled. However, if time traveled is to be the criteria, how much
time is necessary to trigger the deduction? Would a meal expense incurred on an eight hour and one minute trip be deductible while
meal expense incurred on an eight hour trip would not? The arbitrariness of this time distinction would appear to make this option
less attractive than the rule advanced by the Commissioner in Correll,
which provided tighter congruence with the statute’s rationale. If the
taxpayer sleeps away from home, he or she is necessarily separated
from the food preparation facilities, which have already been paid

138

“Alternatives to the Commissioner’s sleep or rest rule are of course available.
Improvements might be imagined. But we do not sit as a committee of revision to
perfect the administration of the tax laws.” Correll, 389 U.S. at 306–07.
139
“The taxpayer must ordinarily ‘maintain a home for his family at his own expense even when he is absent on business,’ and if he is required to stop for sleep or
rest, ‘continuing costs incurred at a permanent place of abode are duplicated.’” Id.
at 306 n.18 (citations omitted).
140
“And the Commissioner’s rule surely makes more sense than one which would
allow the respondent . . . to deduct the cost of his breakfast and lunch simply because
he spends a greater percentage of his time at the wheel than the commuter who eats
breakfast on his way to work and lunch a block from his office.” Id. at 304.
141
“The language of the statute— ‘meals and lodging … away from home’—is obviously not self-defining. And to the extent that the words chosen by Congress cut in
either direction, they tend to support rather than defeat the Commissioner’s position . . . .” Id.
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for, and must seek local food preparation at a duplicative cost. This
means, of course, that Taxpayer A, who travels one thousand miles in
her business day but never sleeps away from home, will get no deduction, but Taxpayer B, who travels fewer miles but does sleep away
from home, will get the deduction. While not a perfect fit, this distinction is closer to that contemplated by Congress and more
material to the question of categorization of the taxpayers into
groups for purposes of horizontal equity.
Correll appears to be the only case in which the Court employed
a content-based substantive horizontal equity analysis. However, the
Court in Correll also applied a systemic horizontal equity analysis when
it required that §§ 162 and 262 be reconciled for both consistency
142
and certainty.
This reconciliation is well within the systemic horizontal equity norm of consistency. Accordingly, the use of one type
of horizontal equity analysis does not preclude the other. It appears
that the Court believes that Congress intends to incorporate both
143
horizontal equity principles in the legislation it passes. If that were
true, the Court would be justified in applying those same principles
in the interpretative process. However, substantive questions concerning income, wealth, or consumption levels are seldom
contemplated by the Court, which usually confines its inquiry to questions of consistency, regularity, and certainty.
In applying a substantive horizontal equity analysis, the Court in
Correll classified taxpayers into similar groups by looking for distinc144
tions that most closely tracked the statute’s underlying principles.
The Court rejected distinctions that excluded taxpayers who logically
142

“[T]he Commissioner has achieved not only ease and certainty of application
but also substantial fairness . . . .” Id. at 303. Accordingly, the systemic principle of
certainty and the substantive principle of ability to pay are reconciled in this decision.
143
“Not surprisingly, therefore, Congress did not extend the special benefits of
§ 162(a)(2) to every conceivable situation involving business travel.” Id. at 302.
144
The Court stated:
Any rule in this area must make some rather arbitrary distinctions,
but at least the sleep or rest rule avoids the obvious inequity of permitting the New Yorker who makes a quick trip to Washington and back,
missing neither his breakfast nor his dinner at home, to deduct the
cost of his lunch merely because he covers more miles than the salesman who travels locally and must finance all his meals without the help
of the Federal Treasury. And the Commissioner’s rule surely makes
more sense than one which would allow the respondent in this case to
deduct the cost of his breakfast and lunch simply because he spends a
greater percentage of his time at the wheel than the commuter who
eats breakfast on his way to work and lunch a block from his office.
Correll, 389 U.S. at 303–04.

WOOD 1-9-06 FINAL.DOC

2006]

1/9/2006 10:04:26 AM

THE JURISPRUDENCE OF TAX FAIRNESS
145

451

should have been within the beneficial category.
Accordingly, the
classifications offered by the taxpayers that were over- or underinclusive were relevant, but not as congruent as the one offered by
146
Materiality, therefore, in the context of horithe Commissioner.
zontal equity, requires that the criterion used to identify similarly
situated taxpayers be one that most closely advances the underlying
147
reason for the statute.
The lessons of Correll are two. First, the Court used substantive
horizontal equity theory in its construction of one Code provision because it grouped taxpayers according to similarities based on levels of
148
consumption and ability to pay the tax on their business earnings.
In other words, the Court indirectly tracked ability to pay tax with extra consumption incurred for business reasons. This can be
illustrated by imagining two taxpayers, A and B, with identical taxable
incomes of $40,000. Further imagine that Taxpayer B incurs $1,000
in meal and lodging expenses, that duplicate his personal expenses,
but which are incurred for business reasons, whereas Taxpayer A
does not. If Taxpayer B cannot further reduce his taxable income by
those expenses, then his taxable income will be artificially high,
meaning that although his taxable income would be $40,000 it would
not reflect one of the expenses incurred in earning that income.
Additionally, he will have fewer after-tax dollars to pay the tax because of the $1,000 he spent on food and lodging, which are
therefore no longer available to pay the tax. Second, when faced with
competing horizontal equity claims, one factor the Court considered
149
In Correll, that
was consistency with other sections of the Code.
150
meant consistency between §§ 162 and 262 of the Code.
This ver145

Id.
Id.
147
See supra text accompanying note 141.
148
The Court stated:
Rather than requiring ‘every meal-purchasing taxpayer to take pot luck
in the courts,’ the Commissioner has consistently construed travel
‘away from home’ to exclude all trips requiring neither sleep nor rest,
regardless of how many cities a given trip may have touched, how many
miles it may have covered, or how many hours it may have consumed.
By so interpreting the statutory phrase, the Commissioner has achieved
not only ease and certainty of application but also substantial fairness,
for the sleep or rest rule places all one-day travelers on a similar tax
footing, rather than discriminating against intracity travelers and
commuters, who of course cannot deduct the cost of the meals they eat
on the road [under § 262].
Correll, 389 U.S. at 302–03 (citations omitted).
149
Id.
150
Id.
146
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sion of horizontal equity falls more neatly within systemic horizontal
equity analysis. Correll, therefore, is an example of the Court using
both substantive and systemic horizontal equity analyses in interpreting the Code. The next case in this section, Commissioner v. First
151
Security Bank of Utah, N.A., focuses on the Court’s use of systemic
horizontal equity analysis.
In First Security Bank, the Court applied fairness principles to determine whether § 482 of the Code authorized the Commissioner to
allocate income from an insurance company to a bank where both
were owned by the same holding company and the bank was prohibited by law from earning the type of income sought to be allocated.
In First Security Bank, as it did in Correll and Commissioner v. Groetz152
inger, the Court used fairness principles to identify similarly situated
153
First,
taxpayers and any reasons for distinguishing among them.
the Court looked for consistency with other federal laws, in this case
154
other federal banking laws.
This reinforced the view that tax fairness requires equal treatment among taxpayers with equal tax
attributes. The Court also injected a more formal notion of fairness
following the form required by other federal laws.
Fairness, as used by the Court in First Security Bank, is a systemic
claim similar to the systemic claim in Correll. In both cases, the Court
searched for ways to increase consistency across the taxing system. In
Correll, the Court found a way to consistently apply §§ 162 and 262 so
as to maintain the integrity of both. In First Security Bank, the Court
applied the tax statute in a way that resulted in increased consistency
with other, non-tax legislation.
155
In Commissioner v. Groetzinger,
the Court again interpreted
§ 162, this time in the context of its requirement that a taxpayer be
engaged in a “trade or business” before any amounts expended by
the taxpayer may be deducted for purposes of the alternative minimum tax as it existed at that time. In 1978, Groetzinger devoted sixty
156
to eighty hours per week to gambling. Unfortunately, his winnings
151

405 U.S. 394 (1972).
480 U.S. 23 (1987); see infra text accompanying notes 155–158.
153
“As stated in the Treasury Regulations, the ‘purpose of section 482 is to place a
controlled taxpayer on a tax parity with an uncontrolled taxpayer . . . .’” First Security
Bank, 405 U.S. at 407.
154
“We think that fairness requires the tax to fall on the party that actually receives the premiums rather than on the party that cannot.” Id. at 405.
155
480 U.S. 23 (1987).
156
See Andrew M. Curtis, Commissioner v. Groetzinger—Supreme Court Holds That
the “Goods or Services” Test Is Not a Prerequisite to “Trade or Business” Status, 22 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 221, 222 (1987).
152
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of $70,000 were more than offset by losses of $72,032. In order to get
the full benefit of his losses for alternative minimum tax purposes,
the taxpayer had to have incurred the losses in his trade or business
as that term was used in § 162(a). In analyzing the statute, the Court
considered its own prior decisions and also considered the fairness of
allowing the taxpayer’s full-time gambling activity to fall within the
§ 162(a) definition of trade or business.
If a taxpayer, as Groetzinger is stipulated to have done in 1978,
devotes his full-time activity to gambling, and it is his intended
livelihood source, it would seem that basic concepts of fairness (if
there be much of that in the income tax law) demand that his activity be regarded as a trade or business just as any other readily
accepted activity, such as being a retail store proprietor or, to
come closer categorically, as being a casino operator or as being
157
an active trader on the exchanges.

In interpreting § 162, the Court embraced a fairness analysis that
identifies similarly situated taxpayers and asks whether there is a systemic or substantive principled reason for distinguishing among
them. In Groetzinger, there was no other statute demanding consistent
158
treatment as there was in Correll.
There was also no claim by the
Commissioner that the taxpayer’s horizontal equity claim would result in a substantially more difficult administrative burden.
The Commissioner’s claim was not founded on fairness in general or on any modern notion of vertical or horizontal equity.
Rather, the Commissioner argued that the statutory language at issue,
the definition of “trade or business,” was resolved by Deputy v. Du159
Pont, in which Justice Frankfurter opined that one must offer goods
or services to be in a trade or business. The Groetzinger Court specifi160
The Court thought
cally rejected this definition as underinclusive.
the taxpayer would be within the DuPont test if one viewed it under a
form of systemic horizontal equity analysis because “it takes two to
161
That analysis is horizontal in that it compares two simigamble.”
157

Groetzinger, 480 U.S. at 33.
Correll, 389 U.S. at 300 (“Because the respondent’s daily trips required neither
sleep nor rest, the Commissioner disallowed the deductions, ruling that the cost of
the respondent’s meals was a ‘personal, living’ expense under § 262 rather than a
travel expense under § 162(a)(2).”).
159
308 U.S. 488 (1940).
160
“But does it necessarily follow that one who does not satisfy the Frankfurter
adumbration is not in a trade or business? . . . In any event, while the offering of
goods and services usually would qualify the activity as a trade or business, this factor,
it seems to us, is not an absolute prerequisite.” Groetzinger, 480 U.S. at 33–34.
161
Id. at 33. The phrase “it takes two to gamble” actually comes from the taxpayer’s brief. Brief for the Respondent at 3, Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23 (No. 85-1226),
158
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larly situated taxpayers—those on opposite sides of a single gambling
transaction. It does not, however, concern a comparison between the
two taxpayers on the grounds of their ability to pay, their wealth, or
their consumption. Instead, it concerns the consistency of their
treatment under the Code.
The Court found no principled reason to define one side of a
business transaction to be in a trade or business while not defining
the other as such, but this alleged imbalance is common. When I buy
milk from the grocer it does not mean that I am in the grocery business. To allow the Court to view both sides as similarly situated, there
must be something more to the analysis than simply being on opposite sides of a single transaction. In Groetzinger, the additional
element is the time spent by the taxpayer in the pursuit of gam162
Thus, the transaction was common between the parties and
bling.
so was the time spent in the common activity. Both sides devoted all
of their professional time to the same activity. This suggests that in
measuring consistency for purposes of horizontal equity, magnitude
is not measured on a separate axis. It is instead a further component
of the primary question of similarity.
Although unstated, the Court implied that taxpayers who occasionally gamble are not within the class of taxpayers whose business is
163
gambling under § 161.
The difference is the magnitude of the
gambling. In order to be within the class of taxpayers who may make
a claim for similar treatment on the basis of their occupying opposite
sides of the same transaction, as in the milk illustration above, the
amount of time spent in the claimed pursuit will distinguish between
those who prevail on the claim and those who will not. Magnitude is
therefore not a separate inquiry from classification under horizontal
equity; it is instead a component of horizontal equity classification.
Correll, Groetzinger, and First Security Bank, along with the dissent
164
in Ivan Allen Co. v. United States, establish three principles for ana1985 WL 669433. However, the Court cites it with approval and suggests that even if
the DuPont test were the only test to be applied, the Court would still rule for the taxpayer. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. at 33 & n.12 (“It takes a buyer to make a seller and it
takes an opposing gambler to make a bet.”) (citations omitted).
162
Groetzinger, 480 U.S. at 36. The Court noted that “[c]onstant and large-scale
effort on [Groetzinger’s] part was made. . . . This was not a hobby or a passing fancy
or an occasional bet for amusement.” Id.
163
“[W]e conclude that if one’s gambling activity is pursued full time, in good
faith, and with regularity, to the production of income for a livelihood, and is not a
mere a hobby, it is a trade or business within the meaning of the statutes with which
we are here concerned.” Id. at 35.
164
422 U.S. 617, 641–42 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“Whatever may be said for
the Court’s view of the ‘unreality’ of adhering to the principles of sound accounting
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lyzing the fairness of statutory construction. First, statutes will be interpreted according to the horizontal equity principle that similarly
situated taxpayers should be treated alike. Second, horizontal equity
itself has two subsets that I have termed systemic and substantive
horizontal equity. The factors used by the Court in the systemic horizontal equity analysis are consistency with other federal law (both tax
and non-tax), regularity, and certainty. Congruity with the underlying reasons for the statute, where the underlying reasons include
consumption or ability to pay, refers to the substantive horizontal equity analysis. Third, the Court will view magnitude of similarity as a
component of defining the class itself rather than as a separate concern.
V. TAX FAIRNESS AS A COMPONENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL
EQUAL PROTECTION
In 1989 and 1992, the Supreme Court handed down two opinions that set forth the Court’s view of tax fairness in the context of
the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. In the
165
first case, Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission, the
Court considered a West Virginia county tax assessor’s practice that
“valued . . . real property on the basis of its recent purchase price, but
made only minor modifications in the assessments of land which had
166
The Court held that the resulting gross
not been recently sold.”
disparities in assessed value of otherwise comparable property vio167
lated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.
168
In the second case, Nordlinger v. Hahn, the Court found that
169
Article XIIIA of the California Constitution, which provided for a
two percent cap on annual increases in assessed property valuation
except for newly purchased, constructed, or transferred property, did
not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-

practice, . . . those principles are the best system yet devised for guiding management, informing shareholders, and determining tax liability. They have the not
inconsiderable virtues of consistency, regularity and certainty—virtues that also assure fairness and reasonable predictability in the Commissioner’s administration of
this penalty tax.”).
165
488 U.S. 336 (1989).
166
Id. at 338.
167
Id.
168
505 U.S. 1 (1992).
169
The California voters added Article XIIIA to the state constitution by a statewide ballot initiative known as Proposition 13. Id. at 3–4. This 1978 initiative has
been described as a “property tax revolt.” Id.
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170

ment.
In those cases, the property could be assessed at its then171
The Court noted, “[o]ver time, this acquisicurrent market value.
tion-value system has created dramatic disparities in the taxes paid by
172
persons owning similar pieces of property.”
These two cases show
that the Court viewed violations of systemic horizontal equity, but not
violations of substantive horizontal equity, as violating the Equal Pro173
tection Clause.
These two cases present the horizontal equity debate in the con174
stitutional context of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In both cases,
the taxpayers successfully established that property owners with similar wealth, as measured by the value of their property, were being
175
In both cases, the
taxed differently by their taxing jurisdictions.
taxing jurisdiction discriminated against taxpayers based on the
length of time the taxpayers held the property subject to tax. In Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal, the Court began by stating:
That two methods are used to assess property in the same class is,
without more, of no constitutional moment. The Equal Protection Clause “applies only to taxation which in fact bears unequally
on persons or property of the same class.” . . . In each case, the
constitutional requirement is the seasonable attainment of a
rough equality in tax treatment of similarly situated property
176
owners.
170

Id. at 10. Pointing out that “the Equal Protection Clause requires only that the
classification rationally further a legitimate state interest,” id., the Court held that the
“[p]etitioner ha[d] not demonstrated that no rational bases lie for either of these
exemptions.” Id. at 17. Despite recognizing the drawbacks of Article XIIIA, the
Court could not characterize it as “irrational” or “arbitrary”:
Certainly, California’s grand experiment appears to vest benefits in a
broad, powerful, and entrenched segment of society, and, as the Court
of Appeal surmised, ordinary democratic processes may be unlikely to
prompt its reconsideration or repeal. Yet many wise and wellintentioned laws suffer from the same malady. Article XIIIA is not palpably arbitrary, and we must decline petitioner’s request to upset the
will of the people of California.
Id. at 18 (citation omitted).
171
Id. at 5.
172
Id. at 6.
173
See also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985) (striking down Alabama statute which imposed substantially lower taxes on domestic insurance
companies than out-of-state insurance companies).
174
See also Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103 (2003) (upholding, for the same reasons as those given in Nordlinger, a statute imposing up to a
thirty-six percent tax on slot machines at racetracks, but only a twenty percent tax on
slot machines on riverboats).
175
See Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm’n, 488 U.S. 336, 366
(1989); Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 1.
176
Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal, 488 U.S. at 343 (citations omitted).
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The problem for the Equal Protection Clause and systemic and substantive horizontal equity is one of classification. If the taxpayer in
Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal is similarly situated to his neighboring property owners, then both the Equal Protection Clause and horizontal
tax equity would require equal treatment. What is needed is a test for
similarly situated taxpayers. Of the two tests we have seen, systemic
and substantive, the Court in both Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal and Nordlinger gravitated to the former.
The Court in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal noted that a taxing jurisdiction could decide to tax property held by corporations at a
different rate than property held by individuals; “[i]f the selection or
classification is neither capricious nor arbitrary, and rests upon some
reasonable consideration of difference or policy, there is no denial of
177
the equal protection of the law.” Both the laws and Constitution of
West Virginia, the state taxing jurisdiction in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal,
provided that all property should be taxed at a uniform rate
178
throughout the state according to its market value. The taxpayer’s
property was of the same class as its neighbors and, under state law,
179
should have been taxed according to its market value.
This, in
turn, meant that there was no state policy that supported the distinctions in tax made by the county tax assessor, and thus, the taxpayer’s
claim of similarity to other property owners was sustained. Accordingly, the Court found that the West Virginia law was being applied in
180
a way that violated the constitutional principle of equal protection.
Once a taxpayer establishes a class of taxpayers to which he belongs,
disparate treatment is prohibited both by the Equal Protection Clause
and by the tax principle of systemic horizontal equity.
181
In Nordlinger v. Hahn, the Court found that property owners
who were distinguished from other property owners in their state on
the same basis as those in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal had no claim under
182
Unlike the taxpayer in Allegheny Pittsthe Equal Protection Clause.
burgh Coal, the taxpayer in Nordlinger v. Hahn lived in a state which
had expressed a rational basis for distinguishing between taxpayers
who had recently purchased their property and those who had held
183
the property for a long time.
The Court stated, “[t]he Equal Pro177
178
179
180
181
182
183

Id. at 344.
Id. at 338.
Id.
Id. at 343.
505 U.S. 1 (1992).
See id. at 12.
Id.
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tection Clause does not forbid classifications. It simply keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are
184
Because the classification of newly
in all relevant respects alike.”
purchased property was supported by rational governmental policy,
the Court found that new property owners were not similarly situated
185
to old property owners under the Equal Protection Clause. The local county taxing authority in West Virginia offered no rational basis
for differentiating between newer and older owners of property,
where doing so was not authorized by state statute, thereby violating
186
equal protection.
California had multiple rational bases for its dis187
tinction and, thus, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
The method for classifying taxpayers, as a necessary prerequisite
for equal protection analysis, is the turning point for the concurring
188
opinion of Justice Thomas and the dissenting opinion of Justice
189
Stevens in Nordlinger v. Hahn. Justice Thomas stated that “whether
190
properties or persons are similarly situated depended on state law.”
Consequently, when the State of West Virginia classified property by
value and the Webster County West Virginia Assessor used the date of
purchase instead of value, there was a breakdown in systemic horizontal equity that amounted to a violation of the Equal Protection
184

Id. at 10.
Id. at 12.
186
Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal, 488 U.S. at 338 (“The Webster County tax assessor valued petitioners’ real property on the basis of its recent purchase price, but made
only minor modifications in the assessments of land which had not been recently
sold. This practice resulted in gross disparities in the assessed value of generally
comparable property, and we hold that it denied petitioners the equal protection of
the laws guaranteed to them by the Fourteenth Amendment.”); see also id. at 344–45
(“In each case, ‘[i]f the selection or classification is neither capricious nor arbitrary,
and rests upon some reasonable consideration of difference or policy, there is no
denial of the equal protection of the law.’ But West Virginia has not drawn such a
distinction. . . . We are not advised of any West Virginia statute or practice which authorizes individual counties of the State to fashion their own substantive assessment
policies independently of state statute.”) (citations and footnote omitted).
187
The court stated:
The . . . exemptions at issue here rationally further legitimate purposes. The people of California reasonably could have concluded that
older persons in general should not be discouraged from moving to a
residence more suitable to their changing family size or income. Similarly, the people of California reasonably could have concluded that
the interests of family and neighborhood continuity and stability are
furthered by and warrant an exemption for transfers between parents
and children.
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 17 (1992).
188
Id. at 18 (Thomas, J., concurring).
189
Id. at 28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
190
Id. at 22 (Thomas, J., concurring).
185
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Clause because West Virginia tax law was not being applied consis191
Classification therefore is first evaluated under state law. If
tently.
the classification into which the taxpayer is placed is rationally based,
then the remaining issue is whether the taxpayer was treated consis192
tent with state law and similarly to other members of the same class.
That is what I have called systemic horizontal equity.
Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion in Nordlinger, expressed his view that the majority believed the Webster County
Assessor acted without rational basis because he acted contrary to
193
state law. In other words, the classification into which the taxpayer
was placed was valid under state law, but invalid under the Equal Protection Clause, since it treated the taxpayer differently from other
members of the taxpayer’s class. The Court specifically viewed Alle194
The issue
gheny Pittsburgh Coal as presenting a systemic problem.
was consistency of category application, not whether there were other
ways of classifying taxpayers. Accordingly, the Court’s decision is
based upon systemic horizontal equity, not substantive horizontal equity. Justice Thomas, in Nordlinger, focused on the Court’s failure in
Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal to declare that West Virginia could categorize
195
The problem was that the
property owners by date of purchase.

191

Id. at 20 (“Moreover, the Court stated, the Constitution and laws of West Virginia ‘provide that all property of the kind held by petitioners shall be taxed at a rate
uniform throughout the State, according to its estimated market value,’ and ‘[t]here
[was] no suggestion . . . that the State may have adopted a different system in practice from that specified by statute.” (alteration in original)).
192
Id. at 23 (“Allegheny Pittsburgh, then, does not prevent the State of California
from classifying properties on the basis of their value at acquisition, so long as the
classification is supported by a rational basis.”).
193
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. at 26 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas
further opined that violating state law did not make the County Assessor’s classification irrational or contrary to the Equal Protection Clause. Id.
194
See Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm’n, 488 U.S. 336, 345 (1989)
(“There is no suggestion in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia, or from any other authoritative source, that the State may have adopted a
different system in practice from that specified by statute; we have held that such a
system may be valid so long as the implicit policy is applied even-handedly to all similarly situated property within the State.”); see also Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield,
247 U.S. 350, 352–53 (1918) (“[I]ntentional systematic undervaluation by state officials of other taxable property in the same class contravenes the constitutional right
of one taxed upon the full value of his property.”). The Court uses the adjective “systematic” in several places, but I have taken the liberty of substituting the adjective
“systemic” in my analysis.
195
“The Court refused to decide “whether the Webster County assessment
method would stand on a different footing if it were the law of a State, generally applied, instead of the aberrational enforcement policy it appears to be.” Nordlinger,
505 U.S. at 20 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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196

State used a different category than the County Tax Assessor.
This
lack of consistency led to the violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. While there may have been substantive horizontal issues presented in the case, they were not the basis of the Court’s decision.
Justice Stevens agreed with the majority of the Court that the
problem in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal was an application problem, de
197
facto rather than de jure, as was the problem in Nordlinger. However,
he parted ways with the majority over whether the California classifi198
cations in Nordlinger were rational.
Using the same rational basis
standard articulated by the majority, Justice Stevens found the classification of property owners based upon the date of acquisition to be
199
He believed that the State’s
arbitrary and unreasonable.
“neighborhood preservation” reason was not rationally furthered by
200
In support of this view,
classification based on date of acquisition.
Justice Stevens offered three rationales. First, he employed horizon201
tal and vertical tax equity analysis.
Second, Justice Stevens argued
that the classification swept too broadly and operated too indiscriminately to rationally further the State’s goal of neighborhood
202
Finally, Justice Stevens disagreed with the State’s arpreservation.
gument that existing property owners had a reliance interest in their
203
current tax rates. This Article focuses on the first of Justice Stevens’
points: that the majority of the Court has uncritically accepted the social policy goals articulated by California and simultaneously ignored
the tax policy implications of the State’s actions.
California adopted the classification at issue in Nordlinger
204
(known as Article XIIIA) by statewide ballot. This classification was
intended to help alleviate the problem of taxpayers whose property
values, and resulting taxes, had accelerated beyond their ability to
205
Many taxpayers purchased their property when land values
pay.
196

Id. at 19–21.
Id. at 31 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
198
Id. at 36; see infra text accompanying notes 208–210, 218–223.
199
Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 33 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
200
“In short, although I agree with the Court that ‘neighborhood preservation’ is
a legitimate state interest, I cannot agree that a tax windfall for all persons who purchased property before 1978 rationally furthers that interest.” Id. at 37.
201
Id. at 33.
202
Id. at 29–30.
203
Id. at 35.
204
Id. at 1 (majority opinion).
205
“As a result [of rising market values], tax levies continued to rise because of
sharply increasing assessment values. Some homeowners saw their tax bills double or
triple during this period, well outpacing any growth in their income and ability to
pay.” Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 4.
197

WOOD 1-9-06 FINAL.DOC

2006]

1/9/2006 10:04:26 AM

THE JURISPRUDENCE OF TAX FAIRNESS

461

were low, and their incomes had not increased at the same rate as the
values of their properties, leaving them unable to pay a tax based on
206
Taxpayers feared they may have to sell
current property value.
207
their homes or risk forfeiture due to failure to pay the property tax.
Justice Stevens, in his dissent in Nordlinger, claimed that the division of property into classes distinguished by date of acquisition was
208
arbitrary and should not pass a rational basis test.
A state-wide, across-the-board tax windfall for all property owners
and their descendants is no more a “rational” means for protecting this small subgroup [those who cannot afford higher taxes]
than a blanket tax exemption for all taxpayers named Smith
would be a rational means to protect a particular taxpayer named
209
Smith who demonstrated difficulty paying her tax bill.

Justice Stevens’ opinion seems to overstate the Constitutional
problem. While a classification that undermines a stated goal in all
respects is presumably irrational, it is much harder to claim that a
classification that promotes the state’s goal in some respects is nonetheless irrational. Certainly, a majority of citizens perceived a link
between classifying property by its date of purchase and property
owners’ ability to pay tax upon the values so determined; a majority
of the Court agreed. Given that the Court viewed itself as applying a
deferential standard, it would be very difficult to find the California
property tax in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the United
210
However, if we limit Justice Stevens’ point to
States Constitution.
tax fairness, then perhaps it has more force.
Nordlinger differs from other cases addressed in this Article because the rule itself (Article XIIIA) contains a classification being
tested against Constitutional and tax fairness norms. As we have
seen, the Court found that Article XIIIA satisfied Constitutional re211
quirements.
In so finding, the Court also reached implicit
conclusions about tax fairness norms. Systemic horizontal equity, as
we have seen it developed by the Court, does not generally include
consideration of taxpayers’ ability to pay unless it is expressed in the
statute itself, as in Correll. Systemic horizontal equity, as employed by
the Court, is content-neutral and does not include questions about

206

Id.
Id.
208
Id. at 32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
209
Id. at 36.
210
Id. at 11 (majority opinion).
211
“Article XIIIA is not palpably arbitrary, and we must decline petitioner’s request to upset the will of the people of California.” Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 18.
207
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taxpayer wealth or income. Substantive horizontal equity, on the
other hand, adds wealth and income of the taxpayer to the analysis.
Even though a legislature might find criteria that would identify similarly situated taxpayers from a systemic point of view, it might
nevertheless treat them differently if other criteria demonstrated that
the taxpayers possessed different abilities to pay tax. The majority in
Nordlinger viewed all California property owners as alike in all but one
way: “Petitioner’s true complaint is that the State has denied her—a
new owner—the benefit of the same assessment value that her
212
neighbors—older owners—enjoy.” The Court has consistently held
that distinctions that are material to the underlying tax policy are valid
means of distinguishing similarly from differently situated taxpayers
for horizontal equity consideration. In Nordlinger, the Court explained that if there is a rational basis for creating a statutory
distinction between taxpayers, the distinction will not violate the
213
LogiEqual Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.
cally, this must mean that statutory distinctions that meet the rational
basis test do not violate either the Equal Protection Clause or hori214
Failure to meet
zontal equity, but this is not necessarily so.
horizontal equity norms should have no bearing on the constitution215
ality of the law, but the majority implies that horizontal equity is a
concern:
As between newer and older owners, Article XIIIA does not discriminate with respect to either the tax rate or the annual rate of
adjustment in assessments. Newer and older owners alike benefit
in both the short and long run from the protections of a 1% tax
rate ceiling and no more than a 2% increase in assessment value
per year. New owners and old owners are treated differently with
respect to one factor only—the basis on which their property is
216
initially assessed.

The Court did not evaluate Article XIIIA by asking about ability
to pay, wealth or consumption. Instead, the Court is concerned with

212

Id. at 12.
“We have no difficulty in ascertaining at least two rational or reasonable considerations of difference or policy that justify denying petitioner the benefits of her
neighbors’ lower assessments.” Id.
214
Id.
215
“Of course, most laws differentiate in some fashion between classes of persons.
The Equal Protection Clause does not forbid classifications. It simply keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant
respects alike.” Id. at 10.
216
Id.
213
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217

consistency.
Consistent treatment of taxpayers in a rationally devised category is all that equal protection and systemic horizontal
equity require.
Justice Stevens asserted that over-inclusiveness resulted in a class
with members whose ability to pay the tax (the putative criterion
218
upon which the class was based) differed.
He claimed that, from
the perspective of substantive tax fairness, this violated the principle
219
In other
of horizontal equity because the class was not horizontal.
words, while it is true that perfect congruity is not required for compliance with horizontal equity, the incongruence of the class in
California was so great as to defeat even a minimal claim of similarity
220
within the class, where similarity means ability to pay.
Although
some “early purchasers” could not afford to pay higher property
taxes, such people only comprised a “small subgroup” of the population. While Article XIIIA protected this small subgroup, it merely
conferred a “tax windfall” on other “early purchasers” who could af221
Further, as owners of commercial,
ford higher property taxes.
industrial, vacant, and other non-residential properties were also in222
cluded within the class,
the connection to ability to pay became
even more attenuated. In Justice Stevens’ view, the State’s interest in
preserving neighborhood character could not be “rationally fur223
thered” by tax benefits for owners of non-residential properties.
In addressing the under-inclusiveness of the date of purchase
classification, the Court seemed to dismiss this claim by noting that
new purchasers were aware that the classification would cause them
224
to pay higher property taxes when they purchased their property.
While this is true, the question remains whether the new purchaser is
better able to pay the tax than the taxpayer who purchased in the
past; knowledge that one will be assessed a higher tax has no correlation with one’s ability to pay it. Justice Stevens viewed the majority’s
position as establishing a “medieval” privilege in families of equal re217

The Court in Nordlinger distinguishes Allegheny Pittsburgh because of the inconsistency of application in that case. “[T]he Court found [in Allegheny Pittsburgh] ‘no
suggestion’ that ‘the state may have adopted a different system in practice from that
specified by statute.’” Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 15 (quoting Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal
Co. v. County Comm’n, 488 U.S. 336, 343 (1989)).
218
Id. at 35 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
219
Id. at 29–31.
220
Id.
221
Id. at 35–36.
222
Id. at 36.
223
Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 36 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
224
Id. at 12–13 (majority opinion).
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sources who are treated differently solely because of their different
225
In other words, as between two families with equal ecoheritage.
nomic resources available to pay for government goods and services
through a property tax, the family whose ancestors had purchased
the property first would pay the lower tax. For Justice Stevens, Article
XIIIA’s classification “offend[ed] a policy of equal tax treatment for
226
taxpayers in similar situations . . . .”
Summarizing Justice Stevens’ view, classifications used to distinguish taxpayers should be based upon their ability to pay (substantive
horizontal equity), rather than on the date they purchased their
property. Justice Stevens believed that both tax fairness and the
Equal Protection Clause require courts to focus on ability to pay in
analyzing tax statutes and classifications. Further, the California classification system did not advance the justifications given by the State
for the classes it created.
The majority believed that the classifications furthered California’s legitimate interests and therefore complied with the demands of
227
the Equal Protection Clause.
This disagreement is at the heart of
any horizontal equity tax fairness debate. No one argues that similarly situated taxpayers should be treated dissimilarly. The issue is
what counts as similar. The Court has only once used ability to pay in
228
its horizontal equity analysis. In Correll, the Court allowed ability to
pay, or more accurately levels of consumption, to be considered in
229
interpreting § 162 of the Code.
Except in Correll, the Court has
never used ability to pay as an element of horizontal equity. The
Court has never decided whether taxpayers are similar or different on
that basis. Seemingly, differences based upon ability to pay will not
be viewed by the Court as valid statutory construction criteria, unless
230
the statute itself raises that concern as it did in Correll.

225

Id. at 30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
227
Id. at 12 (majority opinion).
228
United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 302–04 (1967).
229
Id.
230
But see Miller, supra note 13, at 126. Professor Miller argued that the Court in
Nordlinger violated horizontal equity principles. His view was that using income, consumption, or wealth as indices of equality, the California law can be shown to violate
horizontal equity. Id. at 126–27. My view is slightly different. I contend that in the
context of statutory interpretation, the Court views those criteria as more closely related to vertical equity, and that horizontal equity, at least as it is viewed by the Court,
is content-neutral. Other than Correll, the Court has not employed substantive horizontal equity (income, wealth, or consumption) in statutory interpretation and
seems to reject it in Nordlinger’s Equal Protection Clause analysis.
226
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Justice Thomas stated in Nordlinger that:
Allegheny Pittsburgh assumed that whether properties or persons
are similarly situated depended on state law, and not, as petitioner argues, on some neutral criteria such as size or location
that serve as proxies for market value. Under that theory, market
231
value would be the only rational basis for classifying property.

In other words, while a taxing jurisdiction might use property
value as a proxy for ability to pay, it need not. Moreover, failure to
use property value as a distinguishing characteristic is not irrational
232
and does not necessarily violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Finally, if horizontal equity requires simply that taxpayers be classified
on a rational basis and that taxpayers in the same class are similar,
then horizontal equity is also not violated by the classification system
used by Article XIIIA.
California citizens wanted a law that would ameliorate some of
the problems connected with some taxpayers’ abilities to pay their
property tax. The Nordlinger majority held that California crafted a
233
law that furthered that objective.
The fact that the law might have
been better drawn to help more taxpayers does not mean that the
one adopted was irrational or that it violated systemic horizontal equity principles. Instead, the complaint is that California could have
done a better job of classifying taxpayers on the basis of ability to pay.
The law could have created categories that more closely tracked ability to pay, and thus, the California law is best criticized as violating
substantive horizontal equity principles. A violation of substantive
horizontal equity does not transform into a violation of equal protection or systemic horizontal equity.
From Nordlinger, I conclude that the Court generally excludes
substantive horizontal equity principles from its horizontal equity
analysis. Comparative wealth, income, and consumption are relevant
in creating classifications of taxpayers, but once a classification has
been established, those concerns recede, and the analysis shifts to
whether the classification criteria are rational and consistently applied.

231
232
233

Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 22 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 12 (majority opinion).
Id. at 18.
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VI. THE ROLE OF FAIRNESS IN INTERPRETING TAX ISSUES UNDER THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Article I, Section 8, clause 3 of the Constitution, commonly
known as the Commerce Clause, states that Congress shall have the
power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
234
From this, the Court
several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”
235
developed a concept known as the Dormant Commerce Clause.
The Court uses the Dormant Commerce Clause to provide a level
playing field for interstate commerce, free from undue interference
236
from the states. This goal is essentially a fairness inquiry. Restated,
the Court applies the Dormant Commerce Clause to prevent one
state from unfairly restricting trade in a way that favors its citizens
over citizens of another state. The Court has applied the Dormant
Commerce Clause analysis to situations involving the imposition of
237
taxes upon interstate transactions by states.
In this section of the
Article, I will examine Supreme Court cases that have spoken to
Commerce Clause issues in the context of taxation of interstate transactions. In my view, these cases show that the Court is expanding its
fairness jurisprudence to include not only horizontal equity but also
vertical equity norms.
The Court employs a fairness analysis when addressing two distinct constitutional questions concerning state taxation of businesses
engaged in interstate commerce. First, the Court discusses fairness in
the context of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend238
ment.
Second, the Court discusses fairness in the context of the
239
Although there are substantial similarities beCommerce Clause.
tween the Due Process Clause fairness concerns and those raised by
the Commerce Clause, the Court pointed out that, “[d]espite the
similarity in phrasing, the nexus requirements of the Due Process and

234

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
“Under what has come to be known as ‘dormant’ Commerce Clause Doctrine,
certain state measures regulating or taxing interstate commerce are deemed constitutionally prohibited unless Congress has affirmatively authorized the states so to
regulate or to tax that interstate commerce.” 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 203 (3d ed. Foundation Press 2000). The first case to raise this
point was Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
236
See Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946).
237
See TRIBE, supra note 235, at 203.
238
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992) (“Due process centrally
concerns the fundamental fairness of governmental activity.”).
239
Id. at 313 (“The second and third parts of [the Commerce Clause] analysis,
which require fair apportionment and non-discrimination, prohibit taxes that pass
an unfair share of the tax burden onto interstate commerce.”).
235
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240

Commerce Clauses are not identical.”
Due process is concerned
241
with notice to the taxpayer. Due process requires fair warning that
242
The
the taxpayer is subject to the taxing jurisdiction of the state.
Commerce Clause is concerned with the structural effects of state
243
regulation on the national economy.
In other words, the Commerce Clause requirements reflect tax fairness policy, while
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause fairness is broader and
addresses process fairness questions rather than tax fairness questions. Accordingly, although the Court has used fairness in both its
Due Process Clause and its Commerce Clause jurisprudence, I will
confine my inquiry to the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause analy244
sis.
245
In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, the Court synthesized its
prior jurisprudence on state taxation and the Commerce Clause, and
articulated a four-part test to be applied in analyzing whether a state
tax levied on interstate commerce complies with the Commerce
Clause. In reviewing its prior decisions, the Court observed that:
These decisions have considered not the formal language of the
tax statute but rather its practical effect, and have sustained a tax
against Commerce Clause challenge when the tax is applied to an
activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly ap-

240

Id. at 312.
“[T]he ‘substantial nexus’ requirement [under the Commerce Clause] is not,
like due process’ ‘minimum contacts’ requirement, a proxy for notice, but rather a
means for limiting state burdens on interstate commerce.” Id. at 313.
242
“Comparable reasoning justifies the imposition of the collection duty on a
mail-order house that is engaged in continuous and widespread solicitation of business within a State. Such a corporation clearly has ‘fair warning that [its] activity may
subject [it] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.’” Id. at 308 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
243
Id. at 312.
244
In his dissent in General Motors Corp. v. Washington, Justice Brennan explained
that:
In order to tax any transaction, the Due Process Clause requires that
a State show a sufficient “nexus between such a tax and transactions
within a state for which the tax is an exaction.” This question . . . is the
most fundamental precondition on state power to tax. But the strictures of the Constitution on this power do not stop there. For in the
case of a gross receipts tax imposed upon an interstate transaction,
even though the taxing State can show “some minimum connection,”
the Commerce Clause requires that “[t]axation measured by gross receipts from interstate commerce . . . [be] fairly apportioned to the
commerce carried on within the taxing state.”
377 U.S. 436, 449–50 (1964) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
245
430 U.S. 274 (1977).
241
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portioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce,
246
and is fairly related to the services provided by the State.

My interest lies in the meaning the Court gives to the third and
fourth elements of its test, with particular interest in the fourth. The
third element, non-discrimination, is a systemic horizontal equity
247
claim. The fourth element, fair relation to services provided, is vertical in that it asks whether the taxpayer is taxed at levels consistent
with the services the state provides him. The fourth element asks
whether the taxpayer is contributing more, less, or the same than he
would be required to pay if he were paying the state directly for the
services provided.
A. Tax Fairness, Horizontal Equity, and the Commerce Clause
In Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith wrote:
When the carriages which pass over a highway or a bridge, and
the lighters which sail upon a navigable canal, pay toll in proportion to their weight or their tunnage, they pay for the
maintenance of those public works exactly in proportion to the
wear and tear which they occasion of them. It seems scarce possi248
ble to invent a more equitable way of maintaining such works.

This ancient problem of how best to allocate the expenses of
commerce to those who benefit from the services has given rise to the
Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause tax fairness jurisprudence.
While the Court may start from the principle of proportionality that
Smith advocates, it eventually expands upon that basis to include larger questions of distributive justice.
249
In Freeman v. Hewit, the Supreme Court addressed the question
of whether the State of Indiana could levy a one percent tax on a
transaction by an Indiana resident on the New York Stock Exchange.
250
The Court found that the tax violated the Commerce Clause.
The
third element of the Complete Auto standard requires that the tax not
251
This is a horizontal eqdiscriminate against interstate commerce.
uity analysis since it asks whether there is an identifiable group of
taxpayers who are similarly situated but differently treated so as to

246

Id. at 279 (citations omitted).
Under the decisions discussed below, a state may not discriminate against foreign competitors in favor of in-state businesses. This is a systemic claim because the
analysis is based upon consistency rather than ability to pay, wealth, or consumption.
248
SMITH, supra note 2, at 475.
249
329 U.S. 249 (1946).
250
Id. at 257–58.
251
Id. at 257.
247
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provide one with a marketplace advantage over the other. In Freeman,
the Court stated:
It has been suggested that such a tax is valid when a similar tax
is placed on local trade, and a specious appearance of fairness is
sought to be imparted by the argument that interstate commerce
should not be favored at the expense of local trade. So to argue is
to disregard the life of the Commerce Clause. Of course a State is
not required to give active advantage to interstate trade. But it
cannot aim to control that trade even though it desires to control
its own. It cannot justify what amounts to a levy upon the very
process of commerce across States lines by pointing to a similar
252
hobble on its local trade.

The Commerce Clause does not require that in-staters be treated
253
Accordingly, the Court rejected the
identically with out-of-staters.
horizontal equity claim that would allow state impediments to inter254
state commerce if the state similarly impeded intrastate commerce.
Although the Court rejected the equal impediment horizontal
equity claims in Freeman, and refused to allow the fact that intrastate
sales of the type transacted interstate by Freeman would have been
subject to the same tax, to justify imposition of such a tax the Court
255
uses horizontal equity analysis when the claim is reversed.
For ex256
ample, in American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Scheiner, the Court
held that a tax levied by Pennsylvania only on foreign-registered
257
trucks violated the third element of the Complete Auto standard.
In
other words, treating out-of-state taxpayers like in-state taxpayers will
not insulate the state against a Dormant Commerce Clause claim, but
treating out-of-state taxpayers worse than in-state taxpayers will trigger such a claim.
Through its decisions in Complete Auto, Freeman, and Scheiner, the
Court settled the horizontal component of tax fairness under the
Commerce Clause. Under the third element of the Complete Auto
standard, the state may not discriminate against foreign competitors
in favor of in-state business. That principal is reinforced with the
252

Id. at 254.
Id.
254
Id. (“It is true that the existence of a tax on its local commerce detracts from
the deterrent effect of a tax on interstate commerce to the extent that it removes the
temptation to sell the goods locally. But the fact of such a tax, in any event, puts impediments upon the currents of commerce across the State line . . . .”).
255
Freeman, 329 U.S. at 255 (“To extract a fair tithe from interstate commerce for
the local protection afforded to it, a seller State need not impose the kind of tax
which Indiana here levied.”).
256
483 U.S. 266 (1987).
257
Id. at 277; see infra notes 245–46 and accompanying text.
253
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practical illustration of Pennsylvania’s attempt at taxing foreign trucking companies while exempting domestic trucking companies from
the same levy. Scheiner rejects that tax as unfair to interstate commerce because it discriminates against foreign, similarly situated
taxpayers. The converse, however, is not true. Under Freeman, a tax
on similarly situated domestic businesses will not, of itself, permit the
tax to be extended to foreign business. Something more is required.
The Court left open the door for taxes similar to those imposed by
Indiana in Freeman to be justified if they are imposed to ensure that
258
commerce bears its fair share of the cost of local government.
Bearing a “fair share” of the tax burden can be seen as a corollary to
horizontal tax equity, but it is more often viewed as the separate
259
norm of vertical equity.
B. Tax Fairness, Vertical Equity, and the Commerce Clause
The fairness argument, grounded in the third element of the
Complete Auto test, was addressed in Freeman. There, the Court rejected the appeal to horizontal equity fairness but agreed with the
appeal to distributional fairness when it stated: “State taxation falling
on interstate commerce, on the other hand, can only be justified as
designed to make such commerce bear a fair share of the cost of the
260
local government whose protection it enjoys.”
The connection between taxes paid and services provided is the fairness link the Court
identifies as the essence of the fairness question posed by the Com261
merce Clause under the fourth element of the Complete Auto test.
The Court advanced its theory of distributive fairness in Capitol
262
Greyhound Lines v. Brice, in which passenger bus companies challenged the imposition of an excise tax by the State of Maryland on
the value of buses operated in the state. The Court upheld the tax,
reasoning that:
Complete fairness would require that a state tax formula vary with
every factor affecting appropriate compensation for road use.
These factors, like those relevant in considering the constitution258

Freeman, 329 U.S. at 253.
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
260
Freeman, 329 U.S. at 253.
261
Id. at 256 (“These illustrative instances show that a seller State has various
means of obtaining legitimate contribution to the costs of its government, without
imposing a direct tax on interstate sales. While these permitted taxes may in an ultimate sense, come out of interstate commerce, they are not, as would be a tax on
gross receipts, a direct imposition on that very freedom of commercial flow which for
more than a hundred and fifty years has been the ward of the Commerce Clause.”).
262
339 U.S. 542 (1950).
259
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ality of other state taxes, are so countless that we must be content
with “rough approximation rather than precision.”. . . Upon this
type of reasoning rests our general rule that taxes like that of
Maryland here are valid unless the amount is shown to be in ex263
cess of fair compensation for the privilege of using state roads.

The Court in Capitol Greyhound Lines began a journey on the
road to modern vertical tax fairness. As the quotation above illustrates, the Court wanted to connect the amount each taxpayer paid to
the governmental services used by that taxpayer. This is the very
foundation of vertical equity—the notion that similarly situated taxpayers should be treated similarly, but that material differences
should result in material differences in tax. Similarity means more
than just the substantive horizontal question of comparative wealth of
the taxpayer; it must also include the comparative advantage obtained by a taxpayer in exchange for the tax paid. That calculus
cannot begin until there is some attempt at determining what benefits can rightfully be associated with a particular taxpayer. With that
information, it can be known whether the taxpayer is underpaying or
overpaying for the services received. From there, it can be determined whether the taxpayer is being treated differently from other
similarly situated taxpayers or differently from other differently situated taxpayers.
Substantive horizontal tax equity is foundational to any notion of
vertical tax equity. Questions about what constitutes equal levels of
income, wealth, and consumption, which make up substantive horizontal equity, precede questions about the differences that may
require different rates of tax under vertical equity. Under the Commerce Clause, the first inquiry for the Court concerns the state’s
claim for payment for services rendered to out-of-state taxpayers who
264
use state facilities such as roads.
If consumption of state services

263

Id. at 546–47 (citations omitted).
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977) announced what
became known as the Complete Auto Test.
“‘[I]t was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden
even though it increases the cost of doing business.’” These decisions
have considered not the formal language of the tax statute but rather
its practical effect, and have sustained a tax against Commerce Clause
challenge when the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus
with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate
against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State.
Id. (quoting W. Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938))(footnote
omitted).
264
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can be shown, the inquiry under the Capitol Greyhounds Lines test
shifts to whether the tax is fairly related to the level of services pro265
vided by the state.
Apportionment, the second element of Complete Auto, looks to
whether the state is seeking to tax income unrelated to the nexus that
266
gives rise to the opportunity to tax in the first place.
In other
words, if a bus company earned ten percent of its income from journeys that passed through a given state, the maximum amount of the
taxpayer’s income that could be subject to the taxing authority of that
267
The fourth element of the Complete
state would be ten percent.
Auto test, fair relation to services provided, checks against overtaxation by multiple jurisdictions by limiting tax to amounts con268
nected with the services provided.
265

“This Court and others have consistently upheld taxes on interstate carriers to
compensate a state fairly for the privilege of using its roads or for the cost of administering state traffic regulations.” Capitol Greyhound Lines, 339 U.S. at 543–44.
266
Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 261–62 (1989).
[W]e determine whether a tax is fairly apportioned by examining
whether it is internally and externally consistent.
To be internally consistent, a tax must be structured so that if every
State were to impose an identical tax, no multiple taxation would result. Thus, the internal consistency test focuses on the text of the
challenged statute and hypothesizes a situation where other States have
passed an identical statute. . . .
The external consistency test asks whether the State has taxed only
that portion of the revenues from the interstate activity which reasonably reflects the interstate component of the activity being taxed. We
thus examine the in-state business activity which triggers the taxable
event and the practical or economic effect of the tax on that interstate
activity.
Id.
267
This is the reason behind the Court’s concern in Oklahoma Tax Commission v.
Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179 (1995), that a tax on gross income would be impermissible because it would tax income unrelated to business in a given state and
subject the taxpayer to multiple taxation from multiple states on a given amount of
income.
268
For example, in Oklahoma Tax Commission, the Court stated:
The fair relation prong of Complete Auto requires no detailed accounting of the services provided to the taxpayer on account of the
activity being taxed, nor, indeed, is a State limited to offsetting the public costs created by the taxed activity. If the event is taxable, the
proceeds from the tax may ordinarily be used for purposes unrelated
to the taxable event. Interstate commerce may thus be made to pay its
fair share of state expenses and contribute to the cost of providing all
governmental services, including those services from which it arguably
receives no direct benefit. The bus terminal may not catch fire during
the sale, and no robbery there may be foiled while the buyer is getting
his ticket, but police and fire protection, along with the usual and usually forgotten advantages conferred by the State’s maintenance of a
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The road to vertical tax fairness, on which the court embarked
in Capitol Greyhound Lines, concerns the appropriate boundaries for
determining what the taxpayer should pay as “appropriate compensa269
tion for road use.”
The Court recognized the difficulty in
enumerating the proper charges that the taxpayer should pay, but
the Court also recognized the necessity for making such a determination. Because of this difficulty, the Court cabined the issue and
270
limited the inquiry to charges connected with the use of state roads.
Subsequent Court decisions expanded that inquiry to include other
services from which taxpayers also benefit while within a state.
In Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority District v. Delta Airlines,
271
Inc., the Court uncoupled the connection between the taxes paid
by out-of-state taxpayers from any requirement that those specific
funds be restricted exclusively to the use for which they were col272
This is not to say that the amounts collected by the state
lected.
may exceed the total costs incurred by the state on behalf of the outof-state taxpayer; they may not. Instead, the state may expand the list
of services beyond those directly connected to the activity of the outof-state taxpayer, and the state need not show a direct path from the
273
Thus, one could view
taxpayer to the purchase of specific services.
all taxes paid as fungible. There is no direct link between the reimbursement by a taxpayer for his share of an expense and the
direction of funds paid by the taxpayer into an account dedicated to
that expense. The root inquiry is fairness, and the connection between the cost incurred by the state on behalf of the out-of-state
taxpayer and the amounts paid by that taxpayer is a measure of fairness, not a promise to segregate taxpayer payments.

civilized society, are justifications enough for the imposition of a tax.
Complete Auto’s fourth criterion asks only that the measure of the tax be
reasonably related to the taxpayer’s presence or activities in the State.
Id. at 199–200 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
269
“Complete fairness would require that a state tax formula vary with every factor
affecting appropriate compensation for road use.” Capitol Greyhound Lines, 339 U.S.
at 546.
270
“These factors, like those relevant in considering the constitutionality of other
state taxes, are so countless that we must be content with ‘rough approximation
rather than precision.’ . . . Upon this type of reasoning rests our general rule that
taxes like that of Maryland here are valid unless the amount is shown to be in excess
of fair compensation for the privilege of using state roads.” Id. at 546–47.
271
405 U.S. 707 (1972).
272
Id. at 720 (“Yet so long as the funds received by local authorities under the statute are not shown to exceed their airport costs, it is immaterial whether those funds
are expressly earmarked for airport use.”).
273
Id.
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274

In Goldberg v. Sweet, the Court applied the fourth prong of the
Complete Auto test (the tax must be fairly related to the taxpayer’s activities within the state) by expanding the scope of activities that
could be considered beyond those directly tied to the taxpayer’s activity. The test’s purpose is to ensure that a State’s tax burden is not
placed upon persons who do not benefit from the services provide by
the State. The Court stated:
Finally, we reach the fourth prong of the Complete Auto test,
namely, whether the Illinois tax is fairly related to the presence
and activities of the taxpayer within the State. The purpose of this
test is to ensure that a State’s tax burden is not placed upon persons who do not benefit from services provided by the State.
Appellants would severely limit this test by focusing solely on
those services which Illinois provides to telecommunications
equipment located within the State. We cannot accept this view.
The tax which may be imposed on a particular interstate transaction need not be limited to the cost of the services incurred by the
State on account of that particular activity. On the contrary, “interstate commerce may be required to contribute to the cost of
providing all governmental services, including those services from
which it arguably receives no direct ‘benefit.’” The fourth prong
of the Complete Auto test thus focuses on the wide range of benefits
provided to the taxpayer, not just the precise activity connected to
the interstate activity at issue. Indeed, last Term . . ., we noted
that a taxpayer’s receipt of police and fire protection, the use of
public roads and mass transit, and the other advantages of civilized society satisfied the requirement that the tax be fairly related
275
to benefits provided by the State to the taxpayer.

Here, the Court wanted to prevent out-of-staters from getting a
276
free ride with respect to the services provided by the State.
By expanding the class of services that could be considered in determining
whether the taxpayer was paying his fair share, the Court enhanced
fairness by preventing taxpayers from receiving services without being
charged. The Court also made the analysis of fairness more difficult
by sweeping in fractions of state services that are more difficult to accurately determine.
It might be possible, for example, to
approximate the percentage of the cost of highway services provided
to a taxpayer who uses a highway for a known period of time, but it
274

488 U.S. 252 (1989).
Id. at 266–67 (citations omitted).
276
“Indeed, last Term . . . we noted that a taxpayer’s receipt of police and fire protection, the use of public roads and mass transit, and the other advantages of
civilized society satisfied the requirement that the tax be fairly related to benefits provided by the State to the taxpayer.” Id. at 267.
275
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would be much more difficult to determine the appropriate fraction
of police services for which the out-of-state taxpayer should pay.
In The Myth of Ownership, Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel argue
for a vision of tax policy that addresses not only ability to pay, measured in the historical standards of vertical equity, but also by
including of the full range of benefits and burdens supplied by, or
277
made possible by, government.
Under this approach, if one is
taxed ten dollars but is then provided with ten dollars worth of social
security benefit, police protection, farm subsidy, or roads, it is hard to
see any tax burden at all. Instead, one sees merely a payment for
278
It appears that the Supreme Court has
goods, cash, or services.
taken a few steps on this same road by linking Commerce Clause
fairness to a showing by the State of the goods and services connected
to the tax imposed upon out-of-state taxpayers.
In Goldberg v. Sweet, the Court stated that in evaluating fairness it
is necessary to examine all governmental services received by a tax279
payer.
Thus, a taxpayer who provides telecommunications services
within a state must pay not only for the services provided by the State
which can be tied directly to the taxpayer’s activities, but also the cost
of all government services provided to all who conduct any business
280
The taxpayer must pay the indirect costs of conwithin the state.
ducting business in a state in addition to the direct costs.
The distinction between direct and indirect costs does not imply
that indirect costs are less worthy of being borne by those who transact business within a state. The Court indicated that indirect costs
may be considered in the calculation of whether a tax fairly burdens a
281
Indirect costs are by no
taxpayer under the Commerce Clause.
277

MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 3, at 14–15 (“First, theories of vertical equity are
frequently myopic, in that they attempt to treat justice in taxation as a separate and
self-contained political issue. The result is not a partial account of justice in government, but rather a false one. For what counts as justice in taxation cannot be
determined without considering how government allocates its resources.”).
278
This is also an extension of Rawlsian notions of distributive justice. See Sugin,
supra note 25; see also Musgrave, supra note 10, at 16.
279
Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 267 (“[T]he Tax Act is fairly related to the benefits received by Illinois telephone consumers. The benefits that Illinois provides cannot be
limited to those exact services provided to the equipment used during each interstate
telephone call. Illinois telephone consumers also subscribe to telephone service in
Illinois, own or rent telephone equipment at an Illinois address, and receive police
and fire protection as well as the other general services provided by the State of Illinois.”).
280
“[I]nterstate commerce may be required to contribute to the cost of providing
all governmental services, including those services from which it arguably receives no
direct benefit.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
281
Id.
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means small or inconsequential. They may be significantly higher
than the direct costs of services provided by government, but far less
obvious or simple to compute. The method of computation of indirect costs presents the next fairness problem for the Court.
282
In Massachusetts v. United States, the Court decided whether an
annual registration tax, imposed on all civil aircraft that fly in the
United States’ navigable airspace, could be applied to Massachu283
Noting one of the “two attributes of the taxing power,” the
setts.
Court stated that “in imposing a tax to support the services a government provides to the public at large, a legislature need not consider
the value of particular benefits to a taxpayer, but may assess the tax
284
solely on the basis of taxpayers’ ability to pay.”
As indicated earlier, Murphy and Nagel view traditional vertical
tax equity analysis as insular and divorced from serious distributive
285
justice analysis. However, in Massachusetts v. United States, the Court
endorsed the use of substantive horizontal equity principles to pro286
tect the integrity of vertical equity norms.
Implementing this
approach, the Supreme Court had to determine whether the tax
287
In the end, the
fairly reflected the amount of benefit received.
Court allowed taxing jurisdictions to charge out-of-state taxpayers for
their distributive share of every service the state provides, even
though a precise calculation of that share’s value is not required, be288
cause it found that the tax fairly reflected the benefit received.
Although this analysis is a necessary step on the road to vertical equity
in the distributive justice model, how far the Court may proceed
down this road remains to be seen.

282

435 U.S. 444 (1978).
See id. at 446.
284
Id. at 455 (plurality opinion); see also Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n, Inc. v.
United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340 (1974) (“Taxation is a legislative function, and Congress, which is the sole organ for levying taxes, may act arbitrarily and disregard
benefits bestowed by the Government on a taxpayer and go solely on ability to pay,
based on property or income. A fee, however, is incident to a voluntary act, e.g., a
request that a public agency permit an applicant to practice law or medicine or construct a house or run a broadcast station.”)
285
MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 3, 14–15. Vertical equity norms require the taxing jurisdiction to lay taxes based upon ability to pay, whereas substantive horizontal
equity norms require that members of the classes selected by the taxing jurisdiction
be similarly situated in their ability to pay. Systemic horizontal equity ensures consistent application of the rule.
286
Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. at 468–69.
287
See id.
288
See id.
283
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VII. CONCLUSION
The cases covered herein demonstrate that the Court has followed two separate lines of jurisprudence in applying tax fairness
norms. One line concerns statutory construction and the other addresses fairness in the Commerce Clause context. In construing tax
statutes, the Court has employed two different fairness norms based
upon legislative horizontal equity principles. The first norm, systemic
horizontal equity, is content-neutral and resolves tax fairness questions on the basis of consistency, regularity, and certainty. The
second norm, substantive horizontal equity, which is applied less frequently, is content-specific, and resolves questions of tax fairness
through inquiry into income, wealth, and consumption. The second
line of fairness jurisprudence applies both types of horizontal equity
and introduces a strain of vertical equity by assessing the degree to
which taxpayers, subject to the Commerce Clause, pay for the services
they receive from a given state in exchange for the taxes they pay.
This is the first step in any analysis that seeks to evaluate whether a
taxpayer is over- or under-taxed relative to income compared to services received because it establishes a baseline amount to determine
whether a taxpayer is paying more or less than other taxpayers for
services received. Accordingly, it invokes legislative questions such as
redistribution of wealth and progressive income taxation.
A brief review of the cases covered in this Article shows that in
289
290
both Correll and First Security Bank, the Court recognized that fairness required consistent treatment among taxpayers. There, the
Court looked for consistency with other federal laws (both tax and
non-tax) and congruency with the legislative purpose. Consistent
with systemic horizontal equity, these two factors are used by the
Court to identify similarly situated taxpayers. In Correll, the Court
also examined the statute’s content to determine whether taxpayers
291
were similarly situated with respect to their ability to pay.
This is
the only time the Court has used substantive horizontal equity to resolve questions of fairness in interpreting tax statutes.
In Groetzinger, the Court viewed the continuity, regularity, and
primary purpose of the taxpayer’s gambling as distinguishing him
from similarly situated taxpayers (those in the category of “taxpayers
who gamble”) for whom gambling was but “a sporadic activity, a

289
290
291

United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 303 (1967).
Comm’r v. First Sec. Bank of Utah, N.A., 405 U.S. 394, 407 (1972).
See Correll, 389 U.S. at 304–06.
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292

hobby, or an amusement diversion.”
The degree to which this taxpayer filled the category changed the category itself (introducing a
subcategory of “taxpayers for whom gambling is a ‘trade or business’”), so that one who occasionally gambles is not in the “trade or
business” of being a gambler, but, like the taxpayer in Groetzinger, one
293
who earns a living through gambling is.
294
295
In Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal and Nordlinger, the Court confirmed its interest in applying systemic horizontal equity to the
exclusion of substantive horizontal equity. These two cases illustrate
that the Court will use systematic horizontal equity concerns such as
consistency, regularity, and certainty to evaluate the fairness of tax
legislation, rather than substantive horizontal concerns such as ability
to pay as measured by income, wealth or consumption to determine
the fairness of tax legislation.
The Court’s Commerce Clause tax fairness analysis illustrates a
progression toward current vertical equity analysis. In Goldberg, the
Court endorsed distributive fairness by taking into account the benefits a taxpayer received in evaluating the fairness of the tax imposed
296
However, the Court rejected a simpler analysis
on the taxpayer.
that looked only to cash transfers and income distribution in judging
297
the fairness of tax burdens on taxpayers.
Thus, the Court implied
that the problem of identifying the goods and services that should
count, though difficult, are necessary to seriously consider income
298
and wealth distributions in American society.
In these cases and others, the Supreme Court addressed horizontal tax equity in administrative rulings by applying statutes of
limitations, for example, in ways that ignore the distinction between
299
the government and the taxpayer.
The Court also split horizontal
equity into its two constituent components, systemic and substantive
horizontal equity, in these cases. As the Court indicated, this distinction turns on the definition of substantive horizontal equity as
similarity among taxpayers in terms of income, wealth, or consump-

292

See Comm’r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987).
Id.
294
See Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm’n, 488 U.S. 336, 343
(1989).
295
See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 32 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
296
See Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 266–67 (1989).
297
See id. at 267.
298
See Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 469 (1978).
299
See Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co. (Electric Storage Battery IV), 329
U.S. 296, 301 (1946).
293
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tion, and the definition of systemic horizontal equity similarity
301
among taxpayers based upon consistency, regularity, and certainty.
The preference for systemic horizontal equity is a useful check
on what could otherwise be an unwieldy, ad hoc approach to the
resolution of tax disputes. Systemic horizontal equity analysis allows
the Court to do what it does best: analyze fairness on the basis of
readily ascertainable administrative consistency, regularity, and certainty, rather than on the frequently elusive substantive horizontal
equity norms of income, wealth, and consumption. By dividing the
tax fairness principle of horizontal equity into these two branches,
the Court ensured that similarly situated taxpayers would be treated
similarly in the primary areas of judicial concern: consistency, regularity, and certainty.
In its tax fairness jurisprudence under the Commerce Clause,
the Court has established the need for preliminary analysis concerning the relationship between taxes paid and services received in
evaluating vertical tax equity. While enormously difficult, it seems
that analysis of this relationship is a necessary precondition to evaluation of progressive taxation. Such analysis may prove less difficult in
the future as proxies are found that adequately substitute for detailed
individual analysis of the value obtained by taxpayers in exchange for
their tax payments.

300
301

See, e.g., Ivan Allen Co. v. United States, 422 U.S. 617, 641–42 (1975).
See United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 304–06 (1976).

